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Abstract
While bibliometrics are widely used for research evaluation purposes, a common theoretical 
framework for conceptually understanding, empirically studying, and effectively teaching its 
usage is lacking. In this paper, we outline such a framework: the fast-and-frugal heuristics 
research program, proposed originally in the context of the cognitive and decision sciences, 
lends itself particularly well for understanding and investigating the usage of bibliometrics in 
research evaluations. Such evaluations represent judgments under uncertainty in which typi-
cally not all possible options, their consequences, and those consequences’ probabilities of 
occurring may be known. In these situations of incomplete information, candidate descriptive 
and prescriptive models of human behavior are heuristics. Heuristics are simple strategies that, 
by exploiting the structure of environments, can aid people to make smart decisions. Relying 
on heuristics does not mean trading off accuracy against effort: while reducing complexity, 
heuristics can yield better decisions than more information-greedy procedures in many deci-
sion environments. The prescriptive power of heuristics is documented in a cross-disciplinary 
literature, cutting across medicine, crime, business, sports, and other domains. We outline the 
fast-and-frugal heuristics research program, provide examples of past empirical work on heu-
ristics outside the field of bibliometrics, explain why heuristics may be especially suitable for 
studying the usage of bibliometrics, and propose a corresponding conceptual framework.
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Introduction
Imagine the following scene: Agonizing with burning pain in his chest, a man is brought into 
a hospital. The medical personnel must make a decision: does the man’s state warrant speedy 
transfer to the coronary care unit or would he be better given a normal hospital bed for further 
observation? The responsible doctor does not need much time for reflection; that doctor refers 
the patient to the colleagues at the coronary care unit. In describing a medical situation like this 
one, Gigerenzer (e.g., 2007) asks how physicians arrive at such decisions. There are at least three 
ways (see e.g., Gigerenzer 2007; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Marewski and Gigerenzer 
2012; Marewski et al. 2010a): First, a doctor might not make a decision in the first place, but 
simply follow the rule of thumb to ‘play it safe’ by transferring all patients directly to the coro-
nary care unit. A possible negative outcome of this behavioral option: Many patients, who do not 
warrant that type of special attention, will end up in the unit, eventually risking to congest it and 
potentially provoking patient management problems. Related possible negative consequences 
include exposing patients, perhaps without strict necessity, to health risks (infections) as well 
as monetary costs incurred by the hospital and/or health insurances. Second, rather than follow-
ing a cautionary rule of thumb to pass on patients to the coronary care unit, a doctor might rely 
on a more complex decisional procedure, namely the Heart Disease Predictive Instrument. This 
second option comes in form of a fairly complicated decision tool: in using the tool, doctors 
essentially rely on a logistic regression to estimate the probability that a patient better be assigned 
to the coronary care unit. Third, a doctor might resort to less complex decision aids, for example 
the decision tree shown in Fig. 1. This tree is built around three questions and can be summarized 
in terms of three simple if-then rules for decision making: (1) If the electrocardiogram reveals a 
change in the so-called ST-segment, “the patient is immediately sent to the coronary care unit… 
[without that any] other information is considered” (Marewski and Gigerenzer 2012, p. 78). (2) 
“If there is no… [such change, and the chief] complaint is [not] chest pain…, the patient is… 
[placed into] a regular nursing bed” (Marewski and Gigerenzer 2012, p. 78). (3) If there are no 
ST-segment changes and if chest pain is the chief complaint and any one of five other signs is 
there, the patient is directed to the coronary care unit; else the patient ends up in a regular nursing 
bed. As it turns out, basing an action on the answers to the tree’s three questions can lead to better 
outcomes (e.g., adequate patient assignments) than adopting the more complex regression-based 
Heart Disease Predictive Instrument (e.g., Gigerenzer 2007).1 
The decision tree depicted in Fig.  1 is a fast-and-frugal heuristic (Gigerenzer et  al. 
1999). The word “heuristic” has Greek roots and means “serving to find out or discover” 
(Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009, p. 108). A fast-and-frugal heuristic is a computationally 
simple decision strategy: a heuristic can base decisions on little information, such as on 
only a few predictor variables (hence dubbed frugal), and can, in doing so, allow mak-
ing speedy decisions (hence fast; see e.g., Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier 2011; Hafenbrädl et al. 2016).
1 This introductory example is adapted from Gigerenzer (e.g., 2007; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Mare-
wski and Gigerenzer 2012; Marewski et al. 2010a). While we re-use this example in a context-free way for 
illustrative purposes, the actual story, a summary of data, and other details can be found in Gigerenzer (e.g., 
2007), who describes how the decision tree has been developed by Green and Mehr (1997). Readers familiar 
with the literature on heuristics—the topic of this article—will know this example from different papers on 
heuristics (see also Gigerenzer et al. 1999 for a related example). It is an example that aids to illustrate key 
points on heuristics. In writing this article, we draw on such commonly-used, illustrative and intuitive exam-
ples, hoping that they aid those readers unfamiliar with the literature on heuristics to gain an easy intellectual 
access to that literature and to our arguments. Readers who are familiar with that literature are invited to skip 
those examples and other contents of this essay that merely serve to introduce research on heuristics.
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Under certain environmental circumstances, basing decisions on little information can 
also boost those decisions’ accuracy. To explain, in many real-world situations relevant 
information comes with irrelevant, potentially misleading bits, including mere random 
noise. In addition to not drawing from irrelevant information, fast-and-frugal heuristics 
can exploit the relevant, meaningful statistical structures of decision making environments, 
such as the ways in which decisional options are distributed, or how predictor variables 
correlate with each other (e.g., Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Rieskamp and Dieckmann 
2012). In short, as studies in medicine, business, crime, sports, and other domains suggest, 
fast-and-frugal heuristics can yield smart decisions in classification, forecasting, selection, 
and other tasks (see Gigerenzer 2008a;  Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer 2009; Hafenbrädl et al. 2016, for overviews). In addition, heuristics can cap-
ture how humans actually make decisions; that is, they can be good descriptive models of 
behavior (for overviews, see e.g., Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Marewski et al. 2010a; 
but see e.g., Hilbig 2010; Marewski et al. 2018, for discussions).
In line with Hafenbrädl et  al. (2016),  we believe it can be useful to “actively select 
a … conceptual lens” (p. 216; Italics added) when examining and possibly even shaping 
a matter. This paper aims to introduce one such conceptual framework—the fast-and-
frugal research program (e.g., Gigerenzer et  al. 1999, 2011)—for studying the applica-
tion of bibliometrics to research evaluation.2 Such a framework can aid uncovering which 
2 The fast-and-frugal heuristics framework has been developed, starting towards the end of the past cen-
tury, in the decision sciences (see Hoffrage et al. 2018 for a historical overview). Its founding mothers and 
fathers were a group of researchers around Gerd Gigerenzer, the so-called ABC (= adaptive behavior and 
cognition) Research Group. In introducing and summarizing that framework, this article draws on and bor-
rows from other (overview) pieces on fast-and-frugal heuristics and related topics, among others, Giger-
enzer (2007, 2008a, b, 2014), Gigerenzer et  al. (1999), Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009), Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier (2011), Gigerenzer and Marewski (2015), Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2009), Hafenbrädl et al. 
(2016), Marewski et  al. (2010a, d), Marewski and Bornmann (2019), Marewski and Gigerenzer (2012), 
Mousavi and Gigerenzer (2014, 2017), and Todd and Gigerenzer (2000).
Fig. 1  “A simple heuristic for 
deciding whether a patient should 
be assigned to the coronary 
care unit or to a regular nursing 
bed” (Marewski and Gigerenzer 
2012, p. 78; NTG = nitrogly- 
cerin, MI = myocardial infarc-
tion, T = T-waves with peaking 
or inversion). Source: Adapted 
from Marewski and Gigerenzer 
(2012, p. 78) and Gigerenzer 
(2007, p. 174). The figure itself is 
based on Green and Mehr (1997)
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bibliometrics-based heuristics (henceforth: BBHs) are used, when should they be used (and 
when not), as well as how corresponding heuristics can be investigated. This paper is not 
intended to advocate bibliometrics as means for research evaluation; the use of bibliomet-
rics for evaluating research is highly debatable (e.g., Gigerenzer and Marewski 2015; Gin-
gras 2016; Osterloh and Frey 2015; MacRobert and MacRoberts 2017). Rather, we out-
line the fast-and-frugal research program, provide examples of past research on heuristics 
outside the field of bibliometrics, explain why heuristics might be especially suitable for 
studying the usage of bibliometrics, and sketch out a corresponding conceptual framework.
How the study of heuristics can inform the study of bibliometrics
Our central thesis is as follows. While many real-world environments appear to afford making 
good decisions based on little information (e.g., Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer 
and Gaissmaier 2011; Hafenbrädl et al. 2016), there are still domains in which the dominant 
line of thought prescribes searching for complex solutions: When decision makers in science 
(scientists or managers) evaluate units (e.g., research groups or institutions), complex solutions 
are generally preferred (e.g., because scientific quality is conceived of as a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon). In research evaluation, complexity can come in at least two different disguises:
First, complexity can arrive at the evaluation stage when many indicators are consid-
ered—be they separately presented in long lists or combined into a (weighted) compos-
ite indicator. One example is U-Multirank,3 an international university ranking developed 
recently (van Vught and Ziegele 2012). Alongside the ranking, an indicators book was 
published explaining the many included indicators on more than 100 pages (U-Multirank 
2017). Another example is the Altmetric Attention Score for measuring public attention to 
research which is based on 15 weighted alternative metrics (altmetrics), such as Twitter 
and Facebook counts.4
Second, complexity can come in the disguise of evaluation procedures that include 
numerous internal and external reviews. Those reviews serve to assess institutions and sci-
entists on multiple evaluation criteria, all of which are then often integrated into a com-
prehensive joint score or assessment. For example, many universities have established 
evaluation procedures that start with an internal evaluation in which a research unit (e.g., 
a university department or faculty) evaluates itself resulting in a self-evaluation report 
including comprehensive statistics (e.g., Rothenfluh and Daniel 2009). What follows is an 
external evaluation in which a group of well-known experts visits the department for some 
days. The visit typically finishes with a report on the unit’s strengths and weaknesses. The 
experts’ assessments are based on their own impressions and on the self-evaluation report 
(Bornmann et al. 2006). For these procedures, the unit and a group of reputable peers are 
absorbed—leading to longer periods with little active research.
Bibliometrics offer a method for assessing research activities or entities that is fre-
quently employed in research evaluation procedures (in addition to peer review). With 
3 See https ://www.umult irank .org.
4 See https ://help.altme tric.com/suppo rt/solut ions/artic les/60000 60969 -how-is-the-altme tric-atten tion-
score -calcu lated .
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bibliometrics, research activities or entities are evaluated by reducing the information 
considered to publication and citation numbers. Despite its frequent use, the method 
is often criticized. According to Macilwain (2013), a fundamental defect of quantita-
tive research-assessment tools, such as bibliometrics, is that they are “largely built on 
sand” (p. 255), which means that they cannot directly measure the ‘quality of research’ 
and instead use “weak surrogates, such as the citation indices of individuals“ (p. 255). 
An overview of other critical points on bibliometrics (especially citation analysis) can 
be found in the paper The mismeasure of science: citation analysis, published by Mac-
Roberts and MacRoberts (2017). Critics mention, for example with respect to citation 
counts, that important publications for the advancement of science are not always highly 
cited, that researchers create citation circles which cite each other by courtesy, that cita-
tions can actually have different purposes and meanings, ranging from endorsement to 
critique or that citation styles differ (e.g., Adler et al. 2009; Gigerenzer and Marewski 
2015; Gläser and Laudel 2007; Osterloh and Frey 2015).
Many publications that critically target bibliometrics focus either on the method as a 
whole or on flawed bibliometric indicators (e.g., the h index, Hirsch 2005). We believe 
that many critical points are justified (see e.g., Marewski and Bornmann 2019)  and 
should be considered in the use of and research on bibliometrics, but the points are 
not processed in coordinated research activities targeting what might be a valid reliance 
on bibliometrics in research evaluation. Bibliometrics lack a common, foundational 
research program which could function as an aegis for these activities. We think that an 
important condition for a common program is the existence of a conceptual framework 
(underlying the evaluative use of bibliometrics) which can be targeted by bibliomet-
ric research. The objective of this paper is to introduce the fast-and-frugal heuristics 
framework as a candidate conceptual lens on bibliometrics, so that the usage of biblio-
metrics in research evaluation can be conceptually understood, be empirically studied, 
and be effectively taught. Specifically, if the evaluative use of field-normalized citation 
impact indicator (e.g., the field-weighted citation impact indicator proposed by Elsevier 
in Scopus, see Elsevier 2016) and other bibliometric indicators are conceived of as heu-
ristics, six interrelated areas of research emerge:
First, a conceptualization of these indicators as heuristics asks in what evaluation envi-
ronment which indicator will yield smart judgments, and in which ones not. In contrast, 
the bibliometric literature has, thus far, focused on flawed bibliometric indicators which, 
according to this literature, should be fully abandoned or be replaced by more suitable indi-
cators. A heuristic view on indicators would instead be ecological: just like any heuris-
tic (see e.g., Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2017), per se hardly 
any indicator is “good or bad” (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011, p. 474); instead the per-
formance of each indicator hinges on the task environment (see Waltman and van Eck 
2016). Precisely describing the environments in which each heuristic works, in turns, is 
one of the key research goals of the fast-and-frugal heuristics framework (e.g., Gigerenzer 
et al. 1999; Todd et al. 2012).5
5 Note that this ecological focus is one of the several lines of division between the fast-and-frugal heuristics 
and alternative approaches to studying decision making. The literature on heuristics-and-biases (e.g., Kah-
nemann et al. 1982), for instance, is often taken to suggest that heuristics are error-prone and biased mental 
shortcuts that rational decision makers ought to avoid (see e.g., Marewski et al. 2010a, b, for a discussion; 
see also Lopes 1991, 1992).
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Second, the fast-and-frugal heuristics framework prescribes not only studying when 
which heuristic will ‘work well’ and when each will ‘fail’; this framework also asks the 
question when and how people will use which heuristic  (e.g., Bröder 2011; Gigerenzer 
2008a; Gigerenzer et  al. 1999, 2011; Marewski and Schooler 2011; Rieskamp and Otto 
2006). Hence, descriptive work on bibliometrics would investigate when and how scien-
tists, administrators, and others rely on field-normalized citation impact indicators  and 
other indicators in decision making. Models of heuristics aspire to capture   decisional 
(e.g., cognitive) processes (e.g., computational steps)  and not only the outcomes (i.e., 
results) of problem solving (e.g., Hafenbrädl et  al. 2016; for examples see e.g. Brand-
stätter et al. 2006; Bröder and Gaissmaier 2007).  Those models (1) are cast in terms of 
algorithmic rules  describing decisional processes; (2) ideally they come with a descrip-
tion of the skills and faculties (including cognitive abilities such as information-process-
ing capacity) required to execute those algorithmic  rules; and (3) ideally they specify 
precisely the  (e.g., statistical) nature of problems which can be tackled (i.e., the task envi-
ronments in which the rules can be applied; e.g., Gigerenzer 2008b; Gigerenzer et al. 1999; 
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Marewski et al. 2010a, d).
Certain construction principles of heuristics apply regardless of whether a heuristic rep-
resents a model of decision making an agent could be assumed to spontaneously adopt or 
a decision aid, engineered to help people make better decisions, with those people being 
trained or instructed to adopt the decision aid. For example, like many other heuristics, fast-
and-frugal decision trees (short: fast-and-frugal trees) such as the one shown in Fig. 1 can 
be cast in terms of three sets of algorithmic rules (e.g., Martignon et al. 2008): A search 
rule that specifies what information (e.g., predictor variables) is searched for and how (i.e., 
in what order), a stopping rule that delineates when information search comes to an end, 
and a decision rule that determines how the acquired information is employed (e.g., com-
bined) to classify objects (e.g., patients). When expressed more generally, the rules making 
up  fast-and-frugal trees can  be represented as follows  (e.g., Gigerenzer 2007; Marewski 
and Gigerenzer 2012; for details see Martignon et al. 2008 or Phillips et al. 2017):
Search rule: Consult predictor variables in a specific order (e.g., as a function of their 
positive predictive value and/or their negative predictive value).
Stopping rule: Terminate information search immideately  once one predictor vari-
able is hit that permits classifying the object under consideration.
Decision rule: Classify that object by relying on this predictor variable.
Skills necessary for using the fast-and-frugal tree shown in Fig. 1 include expertise in 
medical diagnosis, such as knowing how to assess changes in the ST-segment. The clinic 
environment in which this tree will yield accurate decisions must be specified in terms of 
the patient population and its attributes, because the same classifier (e.g., a fast-and-frugal 
tree, an HIV test, or a single  bibliometric indicator used to categorize scientists) might 
yield different classifications, for instance, depending on the prevalence of a condition of 
interest within a population.
Third, several studies on fast-and-frugal heuristics have shown that their predictive accu-
racy can be similar to or higher than that of weighted-additive and other more information-
greedy models (for overviews, see Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2009; Hafenbrädl et al. 2016; 
Marewski et al. 2010a). Let us mention just a few heuristics. Simply weighting informa-
tion equally (e.g., Dawes 1979; Dawes and Corrigan 1974)—which is what the so-called 
tallying heuristic (see e.g., Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996)  does—can yield nearly  as 
accurate inferences as multiple regression which ‘optimally’ weighs information; and   in 
certain situations equal weighting might even end up representing the better option (e.g., 
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Czerlinski et  al. 1999; see also e.g., Einhorn and Hogarth 1975). The take-the-best heu-
ristic (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996), which similarly to fast-and-frugal trees consults 
evidence (predictor variables) sequentially, has been found to outperform, on average, mul-
tiple regression across 20 different environments, constituted by data sets from psychology, 
sociology, demography, economics, health, transportation, biology, and environmental sci-
ence (e.g., Brighton 2006; Czerlinski et al. 1999; Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009). The rec-
ognition heuristic (e.g., Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2002), which relies on name recognition 
as the only predictor variable to make inferences and forecasts, has been found to be able 
to aid decision making in geographical, sports, and other domains (e.g., Gigerenzer et al. 
1999). For instance, a variant of that heuristic can predict the outcomes of Wimbledon ten-
nis matches as well as or better than ATP rankings and seedings from Wimbledon experts 
(e.g., Scheibehenne and Bröder 2007; Serwe and Frings 2006). By exploiting people’s sys-
tematic ignorance (i.e., their systematic lack of recognition of objects’ names), a variant of 
that heuristic can, moreover, even aid to predict the outcomes of political elections (Gaiss-
maier and Marewski 2011).
Importantly, as can be seen from the examples enlisted above, prescriptive research on 
fast-and-frugal heuristics does not just investigate the absolute performance of a given heu-
ristic, but asks how well a given heuristic performs in comparison to competing approaches 
(Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Marewski et al. 2010d; 
Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2014)—including more complex algorithms, expert judgments, 
and other heuristics—in a given environment. That is, heuristics are typically not studied in 
solitariness. Prescriptive research on BBHs could follow a similar ecological benchmark-
ing approach, examining in what environments and to what extent different research evalu-
ation tools (e.g., peer review and alternative BBHs) perform well and when they do not.
Fourth, an adaptation of the concept of heuristics to evaluative bibliometrics seems rea-
sonable, because bibliometrics are commonly used to assess a highly complex phenom-
enon, and one that comes with considerable uncertainty  (see Marewski and Bornmann 
2019). When will potentially different aspects of the scientific merit of an article, the 
achievements of a research unit or of a researcher reveal themselves: in a year from now, in 
five years, or perhaps never? How will those aspects come to light: will a finding lead to a 
revolution in technology and society (e.g., like the invention of steam engines or the com-
puter), or will it ‘simply’ lead to new insights (e.g., about the workings of human mem-
ory)? By definition the future is knowable only from hindsight. But even the present and 
past can be uncertain, namely when the decision maker does not know the ‘true state’ of 
the world and has to infer that state.6
Heuristics are tools for dealing with uncertainty (see e.g., Gigerenzer 2008a; Gigerenzer 
and Marewski 2015). Yet, surprisingly, in the bibliometrics literature, only a few hints at 
heuristics can be found and those are not based on bibliometric-based, fast-and-frugal heu-
ristics as potentially useful tools.
6 In this paper, we use the terms “infer” or “inference” to refer to all judgments where the ‘true state’ of 
the world is unknown to the decision maker at the movement of making the inference—be those inferences 
about the present or past, or inferences about the future (= forecasts). That is, forecasts and predictions are 
also inferences  (see also Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011 for the fast-and-frugal heuristics research pro-
gram’s focus on inferences as opposed to preferences). Classifying research into different categories (e.g., 
‘high quality’ versus ‘medium’ versus ‘low quality’) can warrant inferences, too (e.g., about quality; Mare-
wski and Bornmann 2019).
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For example, Saad (2006), Prathap (2014), and Moreira et al. (2015) conceive of the h 
index (and its variants, see Bornmann et al. 2011b) as a heuristic tool which reduces quan-
titative and qualitative information to a single value. Heinze (2012, 2013) introduces a heu-
ristic tool (actually a classification scheme) “that singles out creative research accomplish-
ments from other contributions in science” (Heinze 2012, p. 583). We have, in different 
contexts, hinted at heuristics ourselves and discussed related notions, such as decision mak-
ing under uncertainty and the historical roots and societal context of the mindless usage of 
bibliometric indicators and other seemingly ‘objective’ statistics (Bornmann 2015; Gige- 
renzer and Marewski 2015; Hoffrage and Marewski 2015; Marewski and Bornmann 2019).
Beyond those isolated examples, to the best of our knowledge, people’s use of heuristics 
in the area of evaluative bibliometrics has not been researched, and even less so empir-
ically. It is unclear whether heuristics are applied and—if so—in what form. If the use 
of heuristics could be identified, their frequency of use could be detected in given task 
environments, and empirical investigations about the validity of judgments based on them 
could be undertaken. Just as in studies on heuristics in other areas, it could become the 
goal of descriptive  and prescriptive research on bibliometrics to formulate and evaluate 
highly precise formal (i.e., computationally or mathematically specified) models that could 
be submitted to fine-grained mathematical analyses, powerful computer simulations, and 
strong experimental tests (for an introduction to formal modeling work, see Marewski and 
Olsson 2009): “formal models of heuristics allow asking two questions: whether they can 
describe decisions, and whether they can prescribe how to make better decisions than, say, 
a complex statistical method” (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011, p. 459).
Fifth, John Q. Public, experts, and other humble human beings are not endowed with 
“omniscience” and “omnipotence” (e.g., Gigerenzer 2008b, p. 4; Marewski et al. 2010a). 
They do not have complete knowledge of the past; they cannot foretell everything that 
will happen in  the future; and their information-processing capacities (e.g., memory 
storage, computational power) are finite. Defying the (classic) rational economic theo-
ries of his time, Nobel Laureate and polymath Herbert Simon coined the term bounded 
rationality to refer to the limits  of human ability. Sometimes overlooked,  Simon not 
only focused on the bounds of human rationality (see e.g., Gigerenzer and Goldstein 
1996; Marewski et al. 2010a): he also stressed that human capacities are adapted to their 
environment. Following Simon’s footsteps, the fast-and-frugal heuristics research pro-
gram has picked up those lines of thoughts (e.g., Simon 1955, 1956, 1990). Heuristics 
are environmentally-fitting tools for managing and reducing complexity, for instance, by 
allowing decision makers to focus on a few relevant objects or attributes (e.g., predictor 
variables) this way simplifying decision tasks. In conceiving of the fast-and-frugal heu-
ristics program as a conceptual lens for studying bibliometrics in research evaluation, 
we suggest that those heuristics might ease the complex process of assessing scientific 
quality and deciding on units (e.g., on scientists, research groups, or countries; Born-
mann 2015).
Specifically, research on BBHs could ask the question (i) to what extent (i.e., com-
pared to other procedures) effort-reductions and time-savings occur, as well as (ii) when 
that is the case—that is, in what environments. As we will discuss in more detail below, 
the rationality of relying on heuristics depends not only on the environment, but also on 
the goals of decision making (Marewski et al. 2010a; Marewski and Gigerenzer 2012). 
Hence, fast-and-frugal heuristics are not just systematically evaluated in terms of one 
single performance criterion (e.g., accuracy when making inferences), but in terms 
of those criteria that match the task environment and goals at hand (Gigerenzer et  al. 
1999). For example, in some situations reducing effort, saving time, and/or making 
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accurate inferences might be primary goals; in others (e.g., in strategic interactions), 
being transparent, predictable, and/or fair vis-à-vis cooperation partners might be what 
a decision maker cares most about (see also Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Hafen-
brädl et al. 2016).
Sixth, ever since citations are used as measures of quality or research impact, sci-
entists have tried to formulate theories of citations (Bornmann and Daniel 2008; Moed 
2017). Those theories do not focus on the evaluative use of citations, but on the process 
of citing: why do authors (researchers) cite certain papers and not others? Two prom-
inent citation theories have been introduced hitherto (see overviews in Cronin 1984; 
Davis 2009; Moed 2005; Nicolaisen 2007). The first is Merton’s (1973) normative cita-
tion theory: publications are cited because they have cognitively influenced the author 
of the citing publication. Merton’s theory provides the theoretical basis for using cita-
tions in research evaluation, since citations indicate recognition by peers and the allo-
cation of achievements to publishing authors. More citations mean more recognition 
and more attributed achievements. Publishing researchers are generally motivated to 
cite other researchers, because they belief it is fair and just to give credit to publishing 
(researching) authors.
The normative citation theory has been heavily criticized since its introduction. The 
most important critical points refer to the fact that the theory does not explain all citation 
decisions (or no real decisions at all). Other factors besides cognitive influence and peer 
recognition play a significant role, so many studies indicate (see the overview in Tahamtan 
et al. 2016). One of the earliest studies in this respect has been conducted by Gilbert (1977) 
who interprets citations as tools for persuasion. Authors select those publications for cit-
ing that were published by reputable researchers in their fields. Thus, it is not the scientific 
content of a paper that leads to citation decisions, but the anticipated influence of the cited 
author on the reader. These accompanying citations are intended to confirm the claims of 
the citing author. The reputation of the cited author and other factors influencing citation 
decisions are mostly regarded to be consistent with the social-constructivist theory of cit-
ing (see the overview in Cronin 2005), which views citations as potential non-scientific 
(e.g.,  rhetorical) devices. Such different theories of citation behavior can be extended in 
three interrelated ways when viewing citation decisions through the theoretical lens of the 
fast-and-frugal heuristics framework.
 (i) For one, heuristics may be candidate models to explain citation decisions: what 
heuristics might researchers use (if any) to decide whom to cite and in which envi-
ronment do they use each heuristic? Since the fast-and-frugal heuristics framework 
assumes people to come equipped with a repertoire of heuristics (Gigerenzer et al. 
1999) that framework may allow, in principle, to reconcile both the normative and 
the social constructivist theory of citation decisions. For instance, one could ask the 
question in what situations researchers rely on heuristics that operate on recogni-
tion and achievement (as in the normative citation theory) and when non-scientific 
(e.g., rhetorical) considerations (as in the social constructivist theory) are key. More-
over, the fast-and-frugal heuristics framework offers computational (and mathemati-
cal) models of heuristics that might be able to combine both theories in unifying 
models. For instance, equal weighting and sequential (lexicographic) heuristics can 
consider multiple reasons for making decisions in a single mechanism.
 (ii) Whereas the normative and social-constructivist approaches focus on the citing 
behavior of authors, heuristics may also model the behavior of those decision mak-
ers who use bibliometrics for evaluative purposes. A corresponding research program 
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could identify which BBHs scientists, managers, and administrators rely upon and 
their reasons for using them. Furthermore, one could examine to what extent different 
research evaluation environments are suitable for using different BBHs. This evalu-
ative dimension is new in bibliometric theory building, which has thus far, mostly 
focused on descriptive aspects of citation decisions.
 (iii) Rather than conceiving of citation decisions in terms of one ‘global construct’ (e.g., 
‘persuasion’), the fast-and-frugal heuristics framework would ask fine-grained ques-
tions about how different environmental structures lead to the execution of different 
heuristics for deciding whom and how to cite, with each heuristic being cast as a pre-
cise computational model of the underlying cognitive processes (e.g., comprised of 
algorithmic search, stopping, and decision rules; see above). Precisely modelling the 
interplay of decision processes and environmental structure is important for studying 
bibliometrics as a research evaluation tool, as this interplay will influence the ‘val-
ues’ that bibliometric indicators take (e.g., citation rates, h indices, journal impact 
factors) in given environments. Put differently, the ‘micro-level’ decisions of publish-
ing and citing scientists shape the ‘marco-level’ environments in which bibliometrics 
are applied for research evaluation purposes. Understanding how individual behavior 
(e.g., those of citing authors) shapes up different ‘macro-level’ environments might 
aid to model when different indicators will work well and when they will fail from 
a prescriptive point of view.
Decision making under uncertainty: theory and implications
In the introduction, we presented contemporary examples of complex evaluation methods 
(e.g., ‘U-Multirank’). Yet, the idea that challenging  judgment problems such as reserach 
evaluation, ideally, warrant complex, multi-perspective, well-thought through (e.g., ana-
lytic)  solutions instead of ‘simplistic’ (e.g., one-dimensional) heuristic shortcuts  is not 
new—it is a widespread  conception of the world that comes in many facets, with  cer-
tain  roots going back to the past century, and with others spreading even farther  back 
into history, including to  the Enlightenment. At the time, characters such as Pierre Fer-
mat and Blaise Pascal, and later the Bernoulli cousins, Daniel and Nicholas, forged impor-
tant elements of what are, nowadays, classic optimization (maximization) approaches to 
understanding ‘rational’ judgment and decision making (Brandstätter et al. 2006; Gigeren-
zer 2008b; Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Hafenbrädl et al. 2016; Hoffrage and Marewski 2015). 
As is frequently pointed out (e.g., Hafenbrädl et  al. 2016), well-known contemporary 
examples of optimization come with the maximization of (subjective) expected utility and 
models of Bayesian inference (e.g., Arrow 1966; Edwards 1954; Savage 1954; von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern 1947). One lemma of many of those classics and their derivatives 
is that rational (= optimal) decision making warrants full information; another is that ‘best’ 
problem-solving approaches can be identified—that is, approaches maximizing certain val-
ues (e.g., accuracy, revenue) while minimizing what would be ‘mistakes’ (see Gigerenzer 
2008b; Hafenbrädl et al. 2016). For instance, in the extreme case, classic decision analysis 
suggests people (e.g., investors) can and should (a) consider all options (e.g., investments, 
courses of action) at hand,  (b) enlist every single potential consequence that comes with 
deciding for an option  (e.g., win 200, lose  250), and (c) assess all  consequences’ prob-
abilities of  happening (e.g., 50%, 97%). Finalizing the analysis, they should then compute 
the expected (e.g., monetary) value of each option in order to pick the ‘optimal’ one (i.e., 
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the one that maximizes the monetary gain). Also, the Heart Disease Predictive Instrument 
mentioned above can be conceived of as a representative of optimization; and indeed, many 
statistical methods (e.g., regressions) used in science aim, in integrating information, to 
estimate ‘optimal’ coefficients (e.g., beta weights that maximize fit; Hafenbrädl et al. 2016; 
Marewski and Gigerenzer 2012).
When applying optimization methods to judgment problems, decision makers actually 
make (implicit or explicit) assumptions about the environment in which they decide (e.g., 
Hafenbrädl et  al. 2016). As we have discussed in another paper, this also holds true for 
research evaluation (Marewski and Bornmann 2019). In the literature on fast-and-frugal 
heuristics, a shorthand to refer to one class of those environments is the term risk (Knight 
1921): According to Gigerenzer (e.g., 2014), in worlds of (known)  risk,  options, conse-
quences, as well as their “probabilities are known or can be reliably estimated” (Hafenbrädl 
et al. 2016, p. 216). In those “well-defined and predictable” (Hafenbrädl et al. 2016, p. 216) 
situations, (some form of) optimizing can not only  be viable, but also be  reasonable. Per-
haps the most intuitive examples of such environments are gambles of chance (e.g., playing 
dice, roulette, and lotteries see e.g., Gigerenzer 2014). In theory, so one might believe, in 
those task environments, options in such games (e.g., betting on any number from 1 to 6 
with a dice), their consequences (e.g., win $200 with a 6, lose $41 with any number from 1 
to 5), and probabilities (e.g., 1/6) can be specified and/or be estimated, say in terms of fre-
quencies (Gigerenzer 2014; Hafenbrädl et al. 2016; Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2014, 2017).
Yet, in practice even in gambles surprises may strike (e.g., fraud in dicing): Small 
worlds (see  Savage 1954) of risk—situations where all the  options, consequences, and 
probabilities are knowable—might be conceived of as one end of the spectrum (Gigerenzer 
2014; Gigerenzer and Marewski 2015). Those at the other extremity are called  large (or 
uncertain) worlds (see  Binmore 2007, 2009; Savage 1954)  in the literature on fast-and-
frugal heuristics.7 Following Gigerenzer (e.g., 2014; Hafenbrädl et al. 2016; Mousavi and 
Gigerenzer 2017), in large, uncertain worlds, decision makers may not recognize and know 
all their options, with some options resting forever ‘in the dark’. Decision makers may also 
not be aware of all potential consequences of the options at hand. Likewise, the probabili-
ties that any of those consequences will come about may simply belong to the domain of 
the fully unknown and/or there may not be enough information (empirical observations) to 
sufficiently accurately estimate those probabilities. As Hafenbrädl et al. (2016) point out, 
“[i]n such situations, surprises can occur, leaving the premises of a rational (e.g., Bayes-
ian) decision theory unfulfilled. Not only does uncertainty lead to optimization becoming 
unfeasible or inappropriate, but it also invalidates optimization as a gold standard to which 
other decision processes are compared“ (p. 217) as benchmark.8
7 Savage (1954) distinguished between small(er) and large(r) worlds, and Knight (e.g., 1921) similarly 
between risk and uncertainty (see Binmore 2007). In this article, we use those terms interchangeably, albeit 
following Gigerenzer’s (e.g., 2014; Hafenbrädl et al. 2016; see also Gigerenzer and Marewski 2015) defini-
tions (for a comparison, see Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2014). Also, please note that the notions of risk and 
uncertainty might, generally, be useful ones when reflecting about research evaluation (that is, useful inde-
pendent of whether one studies BBHs or not). For example, we have used those very notions to question the 
meaningfulness of research evaluation exercises, as well as to discuss research evaluation in terms of larger 
historical and societal trends (Marewski and Bornmann 2019). 
8 Indeed, there is a large literature (and a good amount of debate) about the scope of classic rational mod-
els and their (e.g., statistical) relatives (see e.g.,  Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2017; Shanks and Lagnado 2000; 
Todd and Gigerenzer 2000). For instance, Gigerenzer and Marewski (2015) point out that  some authors 
(e.g., Lindley 1983) do believe that Bayesian statistics can be applied to all kinds of uncertainty, including 
single (e.g., isolated) occurrences: to paraphrase the line of reasoning,  after all, one can specify subjec-
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The conceptual lens of the  fast-and-frugal heuristics framework  suggests that most 
real-world decision tasks come, in essence, as situations of uncertainty: large worlds that 
may (or may not) entail elements of risk, but that even if they include some known risks, 
still remain fundamentally uncertain (Gigerenzer 2014; Hafenbrädl et  al. 2016; Mousavi 
and Gigerenzer 2014, 2017). In our view, this also holds true for research evaluation tasks 
(Marewski and Bornmann 2019). For instance, imagine it might be possible to reliably 
assess what budget will be available to fund experimental research at your university dur-
ing the next two years; it might also be known which projects are in need of funding (= 
your known ‘options’). However, what might not be known or knowable is the likelihood 
that any of those projects will lead to an outcome (= a ‘consequence’) that justifies invest-
ing in it in the first place (Marewski and Bornmann 2019). Moreover, while some outcomes 
that could justify funding might be imaginable in advance, others might not be (e.g., think 
of a project unexpectedly leading to new technological developments). Finally, it might not 
be known that (with a little bit of lobbying) the same budget could alternatively be used 
for funding fewer and more expensive longer-term projects (i.e., stretching out beyond the 
two-year horizon). That is, the notion of uncertainty also includes situations where some, 
but not all options, consequences, and probabilities are known (Mousavi and Gigerenzer 
2014, 2017).
To illustrate the fast-and-frugal framework’s conceptual lens on decision making under 
uncertainty in more detail, let us consider inferences about quality (e.g., of departments, 
scientists, manuscripts, grant applicants) in science as example. Elsewhere, we have 
pointed out that,  conceptually speaking, such inferences can be thought of as classifica-
tions (Marewski and Bornmann 2019),9 and as with all judgments under uncertainty, these 
classifications are likely never perfect: evaluators may adequately infer high quality work 
(e.g., sound theory, meaningful empirical results) to represent high quality research (cor-
rect positives); likewise, they may correctly recognize  ‘bad’ work (e.g., flawed analyses, 
trivial results, weak theory) as such (correct negatives). However, evaluators may also be 
misled and consider ‘bad’ work to be high quality research (false positives) and they may 
fully fail to recognize high quality research  (false negatives) (see Bornmann and Daniel 
2010). Those four possible classification outcomes can be visualized in a 2 × 2 table (often 
called confusion matrix). As mentioned above, in developing heuristics for classification 
tasks, the fast-and-frugal heuristics framework would suggest benchmarking different 
classifiers (e.g., fast-and-frugal trees based on bibliometric statistics) in model compari-
sons  (see e.g., Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Mare-
wski et al. 2010d). This way it is, in principle, possible to find out which classifier yields 
9 The points below are framed in terms of the fast-and-frugal heuristics research program; yet those are 
general points about classification under uncertainty that apply to any type of modeling (see e.g., Marewski 
and Bornmann 2019 for the same, following points, framed more generally).
tive probabilities that aliens will land on earth or that Michael Jackson visited the moon—there are “no 
limits” (Gigerenzer and Marewski, p. 431) to coming up with subjective priors and using them in Bayes’ 
rule. As Gigerenzer and Marewski (2015) point out further, other authors have more reservations (see also 
e.g., Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2017): To Savage (1954), the main proponent of modern Bayesian decision 
theory, an unlimited application of that theory seemed “utterly ridiculous” (p. 16)—In his view, “[i]t is even 
utterly beyond our power to plan a picnic”, and that “even when the world of states and the set of available 
acts to be envisaged are artificially reduced to the narrowest reasonable limits” (p. 16)—those who plan an 
action can simply not be aware of every possible consequence that might occur as a result of the action. Fol-
lowing Gigerenzer and Marewski (2015), probably the least debatable area of application of  Bayes’ rule are 
those situations where data are available to empirically and reliably estimate probabilities, such as it can be 
the case in medical diagnosis, informed by systematic epidemiological  observations.
Footnote 8 (continued)
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desirable classifications for a given task environment  (see e.g., Phillips et al. 2017, for a 
practical example and software for fast-and-frugal trees). This way it is also possible to 
develop families of classifiers or variants of the same model. For example, the four out-
comes (e.g., true positives), can serve to estimate positive and negative predictive values, 
which in turn, can inform the ordering of predictor variables when developing and testing 
different (e.g., fast-and-frugal) classification trees.
A series of questions about ecological uncertainty would be raised on the way to con-
ducting corresponding model comparisons. Notably,  when evaluating different classifi-
ers (i.e., in inference, see Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011) an external (outside) criterion 
variable is needed. That criterion variable forms part of the environment. In the medical 
world, such a variable can be the actual health status (absence vs. presence of a given dis-
ease); in industrial quality control it can be likely product quality (zero manufacturing 
errors vs. at least one error), in customer care it can be the clients’ future behavior (likely 
to stay with company vs. likely to leave to the competition)  and so on (see Marewski and 
Bornmann 2019).
Criterion variables are fraught with uncertainties in many real world environments. 
In medicine,  this can be the case, for instance, when there is no way of knowing, for 
sure, what disease has actually caused a patient’s symptoms, or when diagnostic catego-
ries are fuzzy or overlap each other (as in psychiatry). Uncertainty can also arise when 
the criterion can, statistically, not be perfectly predicted from any set of predictor vari-
ables. In many real world domains, the relation between predictor variables and a cri-
terion is obscured by noise; neither the predictors nor the criterion might be stable (but 
e.g., fluctuating in unexpected ways), and there might be unknown variables that shape 
the criterion and what are taken to be known predictor variables. The more sources of 
surprising ‘errors’ there are, the less predictable the criterion will be (see also e.g., Gig-
erenzer and Brighton 2009). Different readers of this paper will likely associate differ-
ent types of  scientific research (e.g., in psychology, education, economics, medicine, 
or metrology) that tries to predict behavior, performance, events, statistics,  and other 
things from different kinds of (e.g., questionnaire, laboratory, field) data with different 
degrees of this kind of predictive uncertainty (e.g., predicting market or crime rate fluc-
tuations from economic indicators,  modeling epidemic deaths from health statistics). 
Also in research evaluation, criterion variables can come with considerable uncer-
tainty (Marewski and Bornmann 2019): Leaving trivial cases aside, how frequently does 
one know for sure how good a piece of research really is? And if ever, when does one 
know this—a few months or years later, or after decades when the revolutionary ideas 
expressed in a paper finally are ripe to become  recognized (Gigerenzer and Marewski 
2015)? Such uncertainties are hinted at by low agreements between reviewers in journal 
peer review procedures assessing the same manuscript (Bornmann et al. 2011a).
Moreover, in research evaluation, the consequences (e.g., costs and benefits) asso-
ciated, at T2, with correct positive, correct negative, false negative, and false positive 
judgments might be difficult to assess at T1, or even completely unknowable. As we have 
argued elsewhere (Marewski and Bornmann 2019),  one can only speculate about the 
‘costs’ (e.g., for society, a national funding agency, an institute, a researcher, patients) if 
a single landmark piece of research is classified as ‘bad’, or thousands of trivial, incon-
sequential empirical findings or even dubious or potentially dangerous (e.g., medical, 
drug-related) ones  as excellent, high-quality work. Sometimes certain costs might be 
known (e.g., the amount of money invested in a  project), but then the benefits com-
ing from that investment might be hard to estimate (e.g., how to estimate the bene-
fits of knowledge transfer  to future PhD students?). Also in areas other than research 
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evaluation,  the consequences of decisions can often only be roughly understood: For 
example, when it comes to breast cancer screening (another type of classification), one 
can ask what costs and benefits are there from a health perspective (see Fig. 2); how-
ever such costs and benefits only become sufficiently predictable after large amounts of 
epidemiological data have been collected (Gigerenzer 2014). Other hidden costs might 
never be known. And if known, different costs might be difficult to be traded off against 
each other (e.g., money versus health) and/or come with new uncertainties (see Mare-
wski and Bornmann 2019 for a more detailed discussion).
The fast-and-frugal heuristics framework suggests to not mistake unpredictable uncer-
tainties for risks (e.g., Gigerenzer 2014; Gigerenzer and Marewski 2015; Hafenbrädl et al. 
2016; Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2014, 2017). Instead, the framework takes uncertainties 
seriously, and in so doing, makes their existence transparent—potentially also in research 
evaluation (see Marewski and Bornmann 2019). The framework does also not pretend 
that optimization is the ‘optimal’ approach  for managing uncertainty  (e.g., Hafenbrädl 
et al. 2016). Moreoever, the framework acknowledges that there might be very different 
answers to the same questions (e.g., about scientific quality), depending on what tools 
(e.g., different classifiers such as different BBHs) one selects (i.e., from the toolbox; see 
Gigerenzer et al. 1999, and below) and depending on what criteria and cost–benefit struc-
tures form part of the decision environment (e.g., Luan et al. 2011; Phillips et al. 2017)—
again, potentially also in research evaluation (see Marewski and Bornmann 2019). What 
is more, in assuming a repertoire of decision strategies to act as tools for dealing with 
uncertainty, the framework allows for flexible solutions to decision problems. To illustrate 
that last point, when classifying scientific output (e.g., as ‘high quality’), the actual goal 
might not be to make ‘optimal’ classifications, but to simply allocate funds to different 
Fig. 2  Benefits and harms (= ‘costs’)  of mammography screening in comparison  to no mammography 
screening. Source: https ://www.hardi ng-cente r.mpg.de/en/fact-boxes /early -detec tion-of-cance r/breas t-cance 
r-early -detec tion
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projects and/or scientists, with judgments about ‘scientific quality’ being used to justify 
such funding decisions. Hence, instead of trying (or merely pretending) to infer quality, 
decision makers might directly resort to other heuristics for selection. That is, a problem 
of inference and classification is replaced by a selection problem.
What heuristics for selection exist? Selection heuristics can implement satisficing deci-
sion processes: the notion of satisficing, coined by Simon (1956, 1990), suggests that 
decision processes are not geared towards optimization (maximization) but towards ‘suf-
ficiency’ in task environments  (see e.g., Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein 1996). For instance, when it comes to searching and selecting a mate, rather 
than considering all possible sexual partners, a satisficing strategy would first set an aspi-
ration level (e.g., based on past sequential encounters with different individuals), and then 
lead a decision maker to pick the first mate that meets that aspiration level (see e.g., Todd 
and Miller 1999, for a discussion). In science, areas of application for satisficing might be 
hiring (e.g., selecting a suitable candidate for a professorship), funding (e.g., identifying 
grant proposals worth being funded) or literature search (e.g., finding a citable paper). To 
elaborate on just one example: instead of trying to rank all scientific output (e.g., of units or 
scientists), and then trying to identify the ‘costs’ of false assignments of ranks, and so on, a 
funding body could simply define criteria (i.e., aspiration levels) for funding eligibility and 
then allocate money to all applications that meet those criteria. Also fast-and-frugal trees 
can be designed as selection heuristics and they have been investigated as descriptive mod-
els for personnel decisions (Luan and Reb 2017).
Heuristics for selection, and inference and classification can be complemented by 
social heuristics. Some of those  heuristics may be  rooted in  our evolutionary history. 
Social heuristics such as Do what the majority does!, When confronting a task, imi-
tate those who are sucessful at it!  (see e.g., Gigerenzer 2008b, 2010; Gigerenzer and 
Brighton 2009; Hertwig and Hoffrage 2013)  can be tools for situations when little is 
known about the task  environment at hand, such as when the criterion variable is not 
directly accessible and/or reliable non-social environmental signals (predictor variables) 
are sparse or otherwise out of reach. As such, social heuristics may aid dealing with 
situations where  individual feedback learning is not possible, difficult, or dangerous (see 
also e.g., Gigerenzer 2010; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; for an entire volume on 
heuristics in a social world, see Hertwig et al.  2013). Danger can arise when immediate 
feedback would imply death (e.g., it is dangerous to try learning how to infer, by one-
self through a reality-check, which mushrooms can be correctly classified as eatable), or 
when the criterion only reveals itself after a time lag (e.g., as in inferences about poten-
tial adverse health effects produced by long term exposure to near-ultraviolet blue light 
emitted by computer screens; see also Gigerenzer 2008b). Also in research evaluation, 
feedback may emerge only years later, for example, when revolutionary ideas become, 
slowly, appreciated within the scientific community (Gigerenzer and Marewski 2015).
Four points key to the study of fast‑and‑frugal heuristics
Indeed, when scientists and evaluators seem to use citation counts as cue (predictor vari-
able) for scientific quality, they might, essentially be relying on social (e.g., imitation) heu-
ristics (e.g., ‘Cite the paper on a topic with the most citations!’; see also section “How the 
study of heuristics can inform the study of bibliometrics”). Often, that might be a good 
idea, just like it can be smart for cattle in a herd to imitate one another when one animal 
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starts, all of a sudden to run (e.g., that animal might have detected a predator). Yet, just like 
a heard of stampeding cattle might run off a cliff, also in research social heuristics will not 
always yield clever decisions—for instance, wrong theses might be propagated for a long 
time. This example and the line of reasoning exposed in the previous section serve to illus-
trate four general points key to the study of fast-and-frugal heuristics (e.g., Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier 2011; Marewski et al. 2010a, d):
The first one is that no heuristic will always lead to clever (or ‘best’) judgments—no deci-
sion mechanism (be it e.g., complex or simple), results in good decisions in all situations (Gig-
erenzer and Brighton 2009; Marewski et  al. 2010a, b). Moreover, often all that  matters is 
not  whether decisions are optimal but whether they are  satisfactory enough (e.g., on aver-
age) relative to an agent’s goals, in a given task environment. Translated to research evaluation, 
this means that no evaluation tool, be it different bibliometric indicators or peer-review, should 
be expected to always yield good judgments (Marewski and Bornmann 2019).
The second one concerns the notion of the adaptive toolbox  (Gigerenzer et  al. 1999): 
Rather than assuming decision makers’ cognitive mechanisms can be best described in terms 
of  just one ‘all-purpose’, domain-general  tool (e.g., one type of strategy) serving  to solve 
every single problem they encounter (see e.g., Marewski and Link 2014), the fast-and-frugal 
heuristics framework posits that people (and animals) can adaptively select from a large rep-
ertoire of different, domain-specific strategies (= including both various heuristics and other 
more complex methods): each strategy (= each ‘tool’ in the ‘toolbox’) is tuned to, and hence 
suitable for, a given domain, that is, a certain task environment (see e.g., Gigerenzer 2008a; 
Gigerenzer et  al. 1999; Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; 
Marewski et al. 2010a, d; Todd and Gigerenzer 2000).10 Being able to smartly choose among 
the different tools from this toolbox as a function of the task environment at hand makes 
up the expertise (and art) of clever professional decision making (see e.g., Hafenbrädl et al. 
2016). For instance, bibliometricians ought to know when to rely on which indicator, and 
when to not rely on bibliometrics at all and to switch to extensive peer-review procedures 
instead (Marewski and Bornmann 2019).
The third point concerns normative criteria for evaluating decisions: How should 
decisions be made? In many areas, conventional wisdom and/or classic models of deci-
sion making and their offsprings are taken to suggest  that the more information  integra-
tion, the better for finding optimal—and hence rational—solutions  (see e.g., Gigerenzer 
and Brighton 2009). In this view, rationality can enter the scene with optimality.  Also 
coherence, as embodied by the rules of logic, is a norm for rational decision making. 
10 The notion of an adaptive toolbox represents a framework, comprised of separate formal (e.g., compu-
tational) models (e.g., of different heuristics); but the toolbox itself is not a formal (computational or math-
ematical) theory. In order to qualify as such a theory, in our view, a series of requirements would have to be 
fulfilled. For instance, the notion of a toolbox would have to be formally integrated with models of how dif-
ferent strategies (e.g., heuristics) are selected as a function of the environment as well as with formal mod-
els of how basic cognitive capacities such as perception and memory represent the environment. That is, 
the notion would have to be implemented into a cognitive architecture (e.g., Anderson et al. 2004). This is 
a nontrivial modelling challenge, and given its magnitude, thus far, only very first (limited) steps have been 
undertaken to tackle it (e.g., Marewski and Schooler 2011). However, corresponding calls for more model-
ling work have, repeatedly, been formulated (e.g., Tomlinson et al. 2011). All that said, there may be no 
unanimity concerning the ways how the notion of an adaptive toolbox is used in the experimental research 
practice (Marewski et  al. 2018). For instance, Scheibehenne et  al. (2013) point out that a toolbox model 
“can be conceptualized as a set of different psychological processes or strategies f and the different param-
eters θf that may be associated with each of them” (p. 41). Moreover, there are models of heuristic selection 
that can be experimentally tested (see Jekel and Glöckner 2018a; Rieskamp 2018, for a recent discussion). 
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In contrast, in assuming an ecological view of rationality (dubbed ecological rational-
ity; e.g., Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2002; Todd et al. 2012), the fast-and-frugal heuristics 
framework  places emphasis on correspondence with the environment (for the distinction 
between coherence and correspondence, see Hammond 1996): what matters is not whether 
a decision is in line with the potentially context-blind prescriptions of, say, logic, but to 
what extent that decision can aid an agent to solve a problem in a given (real world) task 
environment (e.g., Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Marewski et al. 2010a). Moreover, ecologically-
rational  solutions do not necessarily  have to be perfect, but satisfactory for achieving a 
given goal.11 And sometimes, an ecologically rational heuristic for one decision maker’s 
task is a fully unsatisfactory or even harmful heuristic for another. Hence, no strategy is 
universally rational for all people and in all situations; instead the rationality of using a 
given strategy always has to be examined relative to a specific person’s goal in a given task 
environment  (see e.g., Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; 
Marewski et al. 2010a, d).
To illustrate the latter point, if physicians work in an environment where they risk being 
sued for oversights and mistakes, then it is ecologically rational for them to perform diagnostic 
tests and examinations on patients even if they think that those are unwarranted. This ‘con-
servative’ heuristic might not be beneficial for patients, because it increases the false-positive 
rate, potentially leading to harmful over-diagnosis and over-treatment. Yet, the heuristic pro-
tects the doctor from legal actions directed against her. We alluded to this type of defensive 
heuristic in the introduction, when we pointed out that a doctor might simply follow the rule of 
thumb to send all patients who exhibit serious chest pain to the coronary care unit (see Mare-
wski and Gigerenzer 2012). ‘Playing it safe’ is an important goal in many professional envi-
ronments (Artinger et al. 2019). In research evaluation, a prototypical heuristic might be to 
always assess other units (e.g., departments) positively when the review is non-anonymous. 
This defensive heuristic is a social one; using it helps to avoid making enemies. Or, in a public 
funding agency, an administrator may instruct the agency’s evaluation panel what reasons for 
rejections of proposals need to be put in writing: the goal is not only to inform reviewers, but 
to make sure that enlisted reasons are legally bullet-proof so that applicants cannot sue the 
funding agency for rejections. In the humanities, another example comes in the form of evalu-
ations based on bibliometric indicators (Ochsner et al. 2016). Those indicators might be used 
when one believes that numbers are socially more accepted than seemingly more subjective 
assessments (e.g., based on reading papers), even when knowing that the indicators might be 
11 In many domains, ‘perfect’ solutions may not be attainable in the first place. In inference, this is the case 
when criterion variables are highly unpredictable for any model, be it simple or complex. Then perform-
ing just a bit better than chance might be the best a decision maker can do. For instance, when inferring 
which of two options scores a larger value on a given criterion, the accuracy of inferences that can be made 
with the fluency heuristic (Schooler and Hertwig 2005) is often only slightly above chance level (e.g., 55%) 
in  situations where decision makers have no additional knowledge about the options at hand (Marewski 
and Schooler 2011). However, since decision makers have no access to other information, they can do little 
more other than betting on the fluency heuristic (i.e., inferring more fluently retrieved objects to be larger) 
or making random guesses—the latter would lead to chance-level performance (50%). Thus, even though 
by absolute standards the heuristic’s accuracy does not look impressive, when taking into account the deci-
sion situation, it becomes clear why relying on that heuristic can be ecological rational. Research evaluation 
might come with similar situations where achieving even just a minimum of performance can be ecologi-
cally rational.
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less informative (e.g., than the contents of the papers read; see also Marewski and Bornmann 
2019, for a discussion of obsessions with accountability in science).12
The fourth point, key to the study of fast-and-frugal heuristics, concerns the research 
questions to be asked. Specifically, the study of heuristics asks descriptive, ecological, 
applied, and methodological ones  (see Gigerenzer 2008a; Gigerenzer et  al. 1999, 2008, 
2011; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Marewski et al. 2010d; Mousavi and Gigerenzer 
2014), all of which are relevant for the discussion of heuristics in the context of bibliomet-
rics-based research evaluations.
 (i) Descriptive: What are the contents and mechanisms of the adaptive toolbox: 
what heuristics do people use and when do they rely on which heuristic (e.g., Giger-
enzer et al. 1999; Marewski et al. 2010a)? For instance, when will decision makers 
rely on imitation strategies, and when will they try to uncover solutions to decision 
problems themselves?13
 (ii) Ecological: To which environmental structures are the different heuristics adapted, 
that is, when does utilizing a given heuristic lead to accurate, fast, effortless, defend-
able, or otherwise adaptive decisions and when not (e.g., Gigerenzer and Brighton 
2009; Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Katsikopoulos et al. 2010; Marewski et al. 2010a; 
Marewski and Schooler 2011; Todd et al. 2012)? To illustrate this question, under 
what statistical conditions will a given fast-and-frugal tree lead to accurate classifica-
tions?
 (iii) Applied: How can we help people to make better decisions (e.g., Gigerenzer et al. 
2011)? If we know when people adopt which heuristic (descriptive question) and 
when different heuristics lead to accurate, fast, defendable, or otherwise adaptive 
12 In adopting such an ecological view on rationality, the study of fast-and-frugal heuristics can aid both: 
(i) uncovering such defensive social heuristics and (ii) modifying the corresponding decision making pro-
cesses. To illustrate the first point, in modelling London judges’ bail decisions with fast-and-frugal trees, 
Dhami (2003) was able to uncover that those judicial decisions were geared to enable the judges to “pass 
the buck” (see Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011, p. 469; see also p. 467). As to the second point, Luan et al. 
(2011) offer a signal-detection analysis of fast-and-frugal trees that allows, as a function of the goals of the 
decision maker, to engineer either more defensive (conservative) or more liberal trees (see Hafenbrädl et al. 
2016, for a discussion). When building bibliometric indicators into decision trees, the same kind of signal-
detection analysis might  help to create more conservative or more liberal classifiers, leading either to a 
larger probability of producing false negative or false positive research assessments (e.g., classifying, with a 
larger probability, ‘high quality’ work as ‘bad’ or ‘low quality’ work as ‘good’).
13 Corresponding descriptive research on heuristics ideally not only tests models of heuristics, but addi-
tionally includes complex alternative approaches in model comparisons (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011). 
After all, the claim of the fast-and-frugal heuristics framework is not that simple decision mechanism will 
always be relied upon—rather, people adaptively switch between different decision mechanisms (including 
both complex and simple ones) as a function of the task environment. Descriptive research on heuristics 
hence also asks the question whether heuristics are good models of behavior in the first place (e.g., Glöck-
ner et al. 2014). For instance, while the assumption that our cognitive make-up comes with a repertoire of 
mechanisms is common in many areas of psychology and biology (see Marewski and Link 2014, for an 
overview) the decision making literature has put forward alternatives to such multi-mechanism conceptions, 
too, including the proposal that one single mechanism is sufficient to explicate behavior across tasks (e.g., 
Busemeyer 1993, 2018; Glöckner and Betsch 2008). Which type of approach is theoretically more plausi-
ble is debated in the literature (see Marewski et al. 2018, for a special issue on the topic). To give another 
example, for years, the aforementioned recognition and take-the-best heuristics have been at the centre of 
critique, questioning both heir psychological plausibility and the evidence that people rely on those heu-
ristics in decision making (e.g., Dougherty et al. 2008; Gigerenzer et al. 2008; Marewski et al. 2010c, e, 
2011a, b).
Scientometrics 
1 3
decisions (ecological question), we can help people to make better decisions (e.g., 
Gigerenzer 2008a). For instance, decision making can be improved by changing 
(e.g., through policy-making) the environment so that the environment betters fits the 
heuristics used. Decision making can be improved, too, by changing (e.g., through 
training and instruction) the heuristics the decision maker uses so that the heuris-
tics better fit the environment (e.g., Gigerenzer 2008a, b; Mousavi and Gigerenzer 
2017). To give another example of the applied study of heuristics (see Hafenbrädl 
et al. 2016 for an overview), reconsider the kind of classification problems from 
medicine and research evaluation we described above—those where the criterion is 
not directly (or immediately) accessible. Rather than letting decision makers resort 
to selection (e.g., satisficing) or social heuristics, one can try to make the criterion 
more accessible (e.g., through measurement and data bases, such as by making the 
tools for bibliometrics-based institutional evaluations available; but see Marewski 
and Bornmann 2019 and Weingart 2005, for a critical discussion of the increasing 
quantification of science).
   One can also create environments in which making mistakes (e.g., using the 
‘wrong’ heuristic) is likely less costly. Strategies for managing mistakes are well 
known in aviation and increasingly also in medicine as part of the safety culture (e.g., 
Helmreich and Merritt 2016). In research evaluation such strategies might bolster 
the consequences of misclassifications (e.g., evaluating ‘good’ work as ‘bad’)—in 
the extreme case one would eliminate all potentially negative ones (e.g., Do not base 
tenure or funding decisions on bibliometric analyses!; see Marewski and Bornmann 
2019).
   We hasten to add that the applied question also asks when optimization proce-
dures should be relied upon: the toolbox of decision mechanisms consists not only 
of heuristics; also Bayesian models, subjective expected utility-maximization, and 
other complex models have a place in it and there are environments where complex 
approaches should be favored over heuristics. For example, Katsikopoulos (2011) 
developed a simple tree for deciding, more generally, when to rely on fast-and-frugal 
trees as opposed to more complex procedures, notably regression.
 (iv) Methodological: How can people’s use of heuristics and the environments in which 
those heuristics work (and fail) be empirically studied (e.g., Gigerenzer and Brighton 
2009; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Marewski et al. 2010d)? Research on heuris-
tics makes use of a cannon of methods, including experiments and field studies (e.g., 
Bröder 2011), computer simulations (e.g., Czerlinski et al. 1999), and formal (e.g., 
mathematical) analysis (e.g., Luan et al. 2011; Martignon and Hoffrage 1999). The 
methods used are in line with the framework’s theoretical tenets. For instance, 
experimental work in the lab should try to capture actual decision making environ-
ments in the real (outside) world, and not just focus on abstract, artificial (lab) tasks 
(Gigerenzer 2010; Marewski et al. 2010d). Moreover, different heuristics and more 
complex strategies need to be pitted against each other in model comparisons in dif-
ferent environments, and not be tested in solitariness (e.g., Gigerenzer and Brighton 
2009; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Marewski and Mehlhorn 2011). An example 
of isolated ‘tests’ is the pitting of a model of a heuristic against a verbally-specified 
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null hypothesis rather than against other formal models of decision processes (e.g., 
Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2017).14
Reasons for using bibliometrics‑based heuristics (BBHs) instead 
of other strategies for research evaluation
One might wonder why bibliometrics have occupied such a prominent role in research 
evaluation. Other indicators such as the amount of raised third-party funds or number of 
academic awards or presentations could have become equally popular—yet they did not.15 
Similarly, one may also ask why BBHs ought to be studied; strategies for research evalua-
tions built from other indicators might also do the job. However, in practice, bibliometrics 
have certain advantages compared to other indicators:
 (i) The data are available in large-scale databases (e.g., WoS or Scopus covering world-
wide publications and citations in all fields).
 (ii) The data can be used for empirical analyses either within single fields or for cross-
field comparisons.
 (iii) Bibliometrics are rooted in the research process of nearly every researcher. It is the 
task of researchers to make their results publicly available (this differentiates pub-
14 In social science research, it is common to evaluate how well different models explain existing data and 
given observations. A typical case is fitting a regression model to data at hand, and reporting R2 or some 
other measure to establish how good the model is. In contrast, the performance of fast-and-frugal heuristics 
for inference and classification is evaluated in foresight, that is, out of sample or out of population, reflect-
ing actual decision making under uncertainty about the future or unknown (e.g., Gigerenzer and Brighton 
2009; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011). It is in such  predictions where heuristics can outperform more 
complex models (e.g., Czerlinski et al. 1999; Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; for further explanation of the 
difference between fitting and predicting, see e.g., Gigerenzer 2004; Marewski et al. 2010a; Marewski and 
Olsson 2009; Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2014; Pitt et al. 2002).
15 Yet, a completely different class of indicators might focus on methodological aspects of research quality. 
To illustrate this, one could count how many of the papers produced by a unit offer sufficiently complete 
descriptions of methods (e.g., data collection, data analysis) in order to allow for replication studies to be 
conducted, or how many papers avoid improper statistical rituals (e.g., “null ritual” in null hypothesis sig-
nificance testing, Gigerenzer 2004, p. 587; see also e.g., Gigerenzer and Marewski 2015), or how many 
papers correctly distinguish between mere data fitting and actual predictions (e.g., with fixed parameter val-
ues; see Pitt et  al. 2002). In fields such as medicine, the amount of pre-registered studies could also be 
taken into account. Corresponding indicators could be built into heuristics and other strategies for research 
evaluation, and be systematically studied through the lens of the fast-and-frugal research program. One such 
heuristic might be the f-index, suggested by Gigerenzer and Marewski (2015). As they point out, the f-index 
can serve to gauge to what extent a paper contains exercises of hypothesis finding, but problematically sells 
that hypothesis finding as if it were hypothesis testing. Corresponding ‘scientific fishing expeditions’ (hence 
the ‘f’ in f-index), so the argument goes, take place when authors explore their data to find ‘significant’ 
results (e.g. p < 0.05), but frame those ‘findings’ in a way that the ‘findings’ rather seem to be the fruits 
of tests of actual hypotheses, specified prior to analyzing the data (Gigerenzer and Marewski 2015; see 
also Gigerenzer 2004; Kerr 1998). Search rule: Count the number of hypotheses stated in a paper and the 
number of statistical tests, including p-values and confidence intervals computed. Decision rule: If more 
statistical tests are computed than hypotheses stated, then there is a cue suggesting that hypothesis finding 
may be disguised as hypothesis testing. A variant of the f-index might also serve to evaluate the ‘quality’ of 
scientific journals, namely by comparing the number of statistical tests to the number of hypotheses stated 
in articles from a given journal.
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lic research from industrial research) and to embed the results in previous results 
(research stands on the “shoulders of giants”, see Merton 1965).
 (iv) Bibliometrics substantially correlates with other indicators (see e.g., Gralka et al. 
2019), including with those that are usually not available in large-scale databases 
(see point i above) or that more indirectly reflect research processes (see point iii 
above).
 (v) If simple indicators such as the number of publications or citations are used in 
research evaluations, researchers are able to interpret the results based on their own 
(long-standing) experiences in the field. Since researchers are usually publishing 
researchers, they pick up publication practices and citation cultures in their careers. 
They know which journals are reputable, and they have an intuition about which 
number of publications and citations is high or low in their field.
 (vi) Since bibliometric data are available for many researchers and science managers, 
they can be used when time constraints exclude complex methods for research evalu-
ation, when researchers have to assess research activities outside of their own area of 
expertise, or when they evaluate many and big units (e.g., countries). In other words, 
bibliometrics can be applied to situations fraught by capacity limitations. In these 
situations, bibliometrics might provide a ‘ballpark figure’ of research performance. 
Using a bibliometric tool  might be “ecologically rational to the degree that it is 
adapted to the structure of …[the] environment” (Gigerenzer et al. 1999, p. 13), and 
fitting the decision maker’s goals.
 (vii) Bearing, perhaps, a certain resemblance to accuracy-effort trade-offs often assumed 
in other areas of decision making (see Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer 
and Gaissmaier 2011 for a discussion), the availability and use of bibliometrics can 
even be thought of in terms of a ‘rational’ trade-off. Not every research assessment 
is important enough to warrant spending a lot of time; thus, researchers choose 
bibliometric indicators, such as the field-normalized citation impact indicator, that 
save efforts. To obtain a rough impression of the research performance of research-
ers from a department, simple publication and citation numbers can be considered, 
albeit while taking the researchers’ different academic ages into account (Bornmann 
and Marx 2014).
Indeed, there is empirical evidence that simple procedures, such as counting the num-
ber of publications or citations, lead to similar results as the more time-consuming and 
resource-intensive peer review procedure. Auspurg et al. (2015) investigated the research 
rating process by the German Wissenschaftsrat (German science council16) which com-
pared and appraised the performance of German universities and non-university research 
institutions. The authors focused on the research rating in the field of sociology includ-
ing more than 200 institutional research units. Between 2006 and 2008, 16 reviewers 
(well-known sociologists) evaluated these units in an informed peer review process; each 
reviewer had to perform up to 80 single judgments (on an ordinal scale: excellent, very 
good, good, and satisfying). The peer review process was very sophisticated; the group 
of reviewers met at 15 days. The workload per reviewer has been estimated with two to 
three months. In their empirical analysis, Auspurg et  al. (2015) focused on the institu-
tional assessment of research quality by peer review. They performed regression analyses 
16 See https ://www.wisse nscha ftsra t.de.
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for identifying how much variance in the judgements of the reviewers could be explained 
by bibliometric measures (and other indicators which have been controlled). The review-
ers tried to abstain from sheer metrics-based judgements: Although they took institutional 
indicators (including basic bibliometric ones) into account, they made the unique effort to 
read selected publications that had been submitted by the evaluated institutions. Despite 
the reviewers’ efforts, the results of the regression analyses by Auspurg et al. (2015) sug-
gests that the research performance (quality) of the evaluated units—as determined by the 
group of reviewers—could be similarly measured by simpler compilations of bibliometric 
data (number of publications and citations). In other words, it seems that heuristics based 
on pure bibliometric data might have led to similar evaluations of the research performance 
of German institutions in sociology as more cumbersome peer review procedures—at the 
very least, those results motivate asking that question.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the empirical results of another study. Diek-
mann et  al. (2012) examined how a jury awards prestigious prices to articles: citations 
point to exactly the same praiseworthy articles as the jurors do (alike results are published 
by Jansen 2012). Specifically, Diekmann et al. (2012) investigated “whether journal arti-
cles winning a prestigious award of the Thyssen foundation have a higher impact in the 
scientific literature than a control group of non-awarded articles. [O]n average, awarded 
articles harvest significantly more citations than articles in the control group. Most remark-
ably, the average citation rank exactly matches the rank order of awards. The top award 
earns most citations while the second award, the third award and the non-awarded articles 
exhibit citation counts in declining order” (pp. 563–564). In their study, the authors also 
considered that receiving a prestigious award could be the reason for higher citation counts 
rather than an indicator of scientific quality. Hence they focused the citation analysis on the 
period between the publication date and date of price awarding. Since the citation analyses 
exactly matched the results of the peer review process, reviewers (or the Thyssen founda-
tion itself) might as well have relied upon citations as heuristic to select the price-winning 
articles.
Pride and Knoth (2018) investigated the relation between peer reviews and citation data 
at an institutional level using data from the Research Excellence Framework (REF) 2014. 
The REF is the “UK’s system for assessing the excellence of research in higher education 
institutions” (see http://www.ref.ac.uk). The study is based on a dataset including 190,628 
academic papers in 36 disciplines submitted to UK REF 2014 and institutional/discipline 
level peer-review judgments (154 institutions, 36 Units of Assessment, UoAs). The study 
found strong correlations between peer-review judgements and citation data. The results 
suggest—according to Pride and Knoth (2018)—that “citation-based indicators are suffi-
ciently aligned with peer review results at the institutional level to be used to lessen the 
overall burden of peer review on national evaluation exercises leading to considerable cost 
savings” (p. 195). Traag and Waltman (2019) used the same dataset also to investigate the 
relation between peer review and bibliometrics at the institutional level. They found a rel-
atively minor difference between metrics and peer review in clinical medicine, physics, 
and public health, health services and primary care. Similar results have been published by 
Harzing (2017).
Leaving potential caveats aside (see also footnote 14),  the studies by Auspurg et  al. 
(2015), Diekmann et al. (2012), Pride and Knoth (2018), Traag and Waltman (2019), and 
Harzing (2017) could be interpreted as seeming to exhibit—similarly as in other areas of 
research on heuristics—a ‘less-is-equal effect’: a complex procedure uses more informa-
tion than a simple tool and performs extensive assessments, but nevertheless lead to similar 
final judgments. Precisely specifying when, how, and why such effects emerge could be the 
Scientometrics 
1 3
goal of a foundational research program on bibliometrics. Such a research program could 
also ask the more daring questions whether, when, how, and why less information can be 
even better: since such “less-is-more effects” have been documented in reserach on fast-
and-frugal heuristics in other  areas (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011, p. 453); could they 
also emerge in research evaluation if one develops and tests proper BBHs? That is, could it 
be that, under certain circumstances, less ‘effort’ leads to more adequate judgments?
Bibliometrics‑based heuristics (BBHs) illustrated: one‑reason decision 
making in research evaluation
We propose to reflect about bibliometrics in terms of the fast-and-frugal heuristics research 
program  in order to study it through the lens of a theoretical framework. Typically, bib-
liometric indicators are used as shortcuts in research evaluation—shortcuts that seem-
ingly  enable assessing research units in a short time with minimal effort. Furthermore, 
evaluative bibliometrics are frugal, since they hinge on minimal information in decision 
making and ignore the rest. Research achievements are reduced to publication and cita-
tion numbers without considering further indicators, such as number of grants, editorships, 
or contributions to conferences (for an overview of existing indicators, see Montada et al. 
1999).
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) proposed describing heuristics in terms of four broad 
classes of models: “The first class exploits recognition memory, the second relies on one 
good reason only (and ignores all other reasons), the third weights all cues [i.e., predictor 
variables] or alternatives [i.e., options]  equally, and the fourth relies on social informa-
tion” (p. 459). Largely drawing from their overview, in the following section, we discuss 
only a limited number of one-reason decision making heuristics for illustrative purposes. 
Other  heuristics (one reason or not) that, in the context of evaluative bibliometrics, might 
(in the future) be interesting to study are, for example, profiling ones. Geographic profil-
ing is, for instance, used “to predict where a serial criminal is most likely to live given the 
sites of the crimes “(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011, p. 463). Spatial bibliometrics (see 
an overview in Frenken et al. 2009) is an emerging topic in scientometrics with increasing 
popularity. Akin to profiling heuristics, spatial bibliometrics can be relied upon to identify 
hot and cold spots in international research (Bornmann and de Moya Anegón 2019).
What are one-reason heuristics? As mentioned above, social heuristics may be useful 
when little information and sparse (e.g., individual  feedback) learning opportunities are 
available; the resulting uncertainties can let the ‘turning to others’ (e.g., to peers), say for 
observation and imitation,  become a potentially sensible course of action (Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier 2011). In other situations, decision makers have sufficient knowledge to instead 
rely on (non-social) one-reason heuristics. A representative of one-reason decision making 
strategies is the aforementioned take-the-best heuristic  (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996). 
Take-the-best is a model of inference. The heuristic  prescribes sequentially considering 
predictor variables (called cues) in the order of their predictive accuracy (called validity), 
and bases a decision on the first cue that differentiates between options (e.g., Gigerenzer 
and Gaissmaier 2011):
Search rule: When infering which of two options (e.g., two companies) scores higher 
on an uncertain criterion (e.g., future revenue), consider cues in the order of their 
validity, starting with the most valid (predictive) cue.
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Stopping rule: Immediately once a cue is found on which one but not the other option 
has a positive cue value terminate search—without considering any other cues.
Decision rule: Decide for the option with the positive cue value as the one that likely 
scores a larger value on the criterion.
Leaving aside the possibility of using social information to derive cue orders for take-the-
best (see Gigerenzer et  al. 2008), this form of one-reason decision making hinges upon 
expertise, and hence information and/or learning opportunities: to use take-the-best, deci-
sion makers need to know which cues are the most predictive ones in order to sequentially 
consult them (see  also Garcia-Retamero and Dhami 2009; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 
2011; Gigerenzer et al. 2008).
Another sub-class of one-reason decision making heuristics seeks out just one ‘clever’ 
cue and bases decisions exclusively on that predictor variable without (e.g., sequentially) 
considering any others  (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011). To illustrate this type of one-
clever-cue heuristic, in business, Wübben and Wangenheim (2008) examined, empirically, 
different approaches for developing and implementing customer base management strat-
egies. Such strategies are important to managers  and other business professionals; they 
aid them to decide into which customers to invest “marketing budgets”—be it by offering 
certain customers discounts or by  sending them, say, colorful  catalogues  (see Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer 2009, p. 766). Wübben and Wangenheim (2008) observed (i.e., in a small 
sample)  that certain business professionals   may rely on a “simple recency-of-last-pur-
chase rule” (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011, p. 455), the hiatus heuristic, for customer 
classification.
Decision rule: “If a customer has not purchased within a certain number of months 
(the hiatus), the customer is classified as inactive; otherwise, the customer is classi-
fied as active.” (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011, p. 455)
Note that in contrast to fast-and-frugal trees that operate on multiple predictors, the hiatus 
is the only cue considered in this classification strategy. To give another example of one-
clever cue decision making, Wübben and Wagenheim (2008) also empirically investigated 
to what extent a different cue allows making a different bet, namely when it comes to fore-
casting who will be the “future high-value customers” (Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2009, p. 
767).
Decision rule: Infer “that the top X% of customers in the past will continue to be the 
top X% of best customers in the future.” (Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2009, p. 767)
In data sets from airline, apparel, and music (online CD retailing) business areas, this one-
clever-cue heuristic has been found to  single out best customers surprisingly well com-
pared to two more complex models from the marketing literature (Wübben and Wangen-
heim 2008).
One-clever-cue heuristics seem  common—not only in humans. As Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier (2011) note, “[m]any animal species appear to rely on a single ‘clever’ cue 
for locating food, nest sites, or mates. For instance, in order to pursue a prey or a mate, 
bats, birds, and fish do not compute trajectories in three-dimensional space, but simply 
maintain a constant optical angle between their target and themselves…” (p. 463). The 
(frequent) use of certain bibliometric indicators by researchers and science managers in 
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decision making  might be consistent with the definition of  certain one-clever-cue heu-
ristics, too.17 For example, the field-normalized citation impact of papers is used to get 
a rough impression of a researcher’s academic performance. The share of a university’s 
papers which belong to the 10% most-frequently cited papers in their subject category and 
publication year is used in the Leiden Ranking to identify the ‘best’ universities worldwide. 
Moreover, the number of papers published by a research group is often used to estimate its 
‘productivity’.
In their own practice, readers of this paper will have come across many other such situ-
ations where one variable (one bibliometric indicator) is used in research evaluation. In our 
opinion, good reasons exist for studying to what extent (including: if at all) and when rely-
ing on the number of publications, citations, and other bibliometric indicators (e.g., as in 
one-clever-cue heuristics) may be ecologically rational. Research results that are not pub-
lished cannot contribute to the archived knowledge in most disciplines. Thus, publishing 
results is an essential part of being a researcher (in most of the disciplines). A large number 
of publications from a researcher can signal that this researcher is active in many research 
projects, collaborates successfully with other researchers (co-authors), and received funds 
for different projects. In other words, the number of publications is related to other indica-
tors, such as research funds received and (international) collaborations. Furthermore, it is 
essential for publishing scientists to embed their own results in the archived knowledge 
by citing the corresponding publications from other researchers. Citations can  reveal the 
cognitive influences of the cited scientists and the roots on which citing scientists’ research 
stands (see section “How the study of heuristics can inform the study of bibliometrics”). 
Not without reasons, do bibliometricians regard citations as a measure for one aspect of 
quality: the impact of research on research. Other aspects are accuracy and importance 
(Martin and Irvine 1983).
Since a few years, what one might call an (adaptive) toolbox for using bibliometric 
methods in research evaluation seems to be emerging. For instance, Todeschini and Baccini 
(2016) published the Handbook of Bibliometric Indicators: Quantitative Tools for Studying 
and Evaluating Research; Waltman (2016) reviews the literature on size-dependent and 
size-independent citation impact indicators. Most evaluative tasks focus on the output and 
citation impact of scientific units (e.g., of single researchers). When comparing different 
researchers from the same field, an output-oriented one-clever-cue heuristic might be:
Search rule: Search for all substantial publications (e.g., articles and reviews), pro-
duced by two researchers (A and B).
Stopping rule: Stop search once all such publications have been identified.
Decision rule: If scientist A has published more substantial publications than scien-
tist B and both scientists are of the same academic age, then infer that scientist A is 
more active in research than scientist B.
This heuristic may work, so one could speculate, in academic environments where different 
authorship orders play no role (or ‘average each other out’) (Bornmann and Marx 2014).
It is standard in bibliometrics to measure impact in cross-field comparisons with 
field- and time-normalized citation scores. The Leiden Manifesto (Hicks et  al. 2015) 
17 Our use of the term ‘one-clever-cue heuristic’ might suggest that the application of bibliometric indica-
tors is ‘clever’ in general. However, the only reason of using this label here is that the term has been pro-
posed in the literature for a certain type of heuristic. Research on bibliometrics-based heuristics has yet to 
reveal whether and in which environments using different BBHs actually is ‘clever’.
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recommends the percentile indicators as the most robust normalization method: “Each 
paper is weighted on the basis of the percentile to which it belongs in the citation dis-
tribution of its field (the top 1%, 10% or 20%, for example)” (p. 430). The share of top 
x% papers for units in research can allow making a decision on their ‘standing’: higher 
values than x might point to units with an ‘above average’ impact in the corresponding 
fields and publication years. Thus, the decision rule for an impact-oriented heuristic for 
institutional assessments might be:
Search rule: Search for all substantial publications (e.g., articles and reviews), 
produced by the institute.
Stopping rule: Stop search once all such publications have been identified.
Decision rule: If the institute has published papers over several years with more 
than x% (e.g., say, 20%) top 10% papers in the corresponding fields and publica-
tion years, the institute has a (significantly) better performance than an ‘average’ 
institute in the world.
This decision rule somewhat resembles the hiatus heuristic mentioned above. Of course, 
using this heuristic would come with certain assumtions about the (e.g., distributional) 
structure of the world (and the meaningfulness of the notion of ‘above average’ in the 
context of research evaluation).18
Importantly, just as with other heuristics in the adaptive toolbox, the ecological ration-
aly of relying on any one-reason BBHs depends on environmental structure and the goals 
of the decision maker. When a decision maker wants to make predictions, outside the realm 
of research evaluation, statistical aspects of the environmental structure  can include, for 
instance, “1. Uncertainty: how well a criterion can be predicted. 2. Redundancy: the cor-
relation between cues [i.e., predictor variables]. 3. Sample size: number of observations 
(relative to number of cues). 4. Variability in weights: the distribution of the cue weights 
(e.g., skewed or uniform)” (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011, p. 457; for an entire book 
focusing on the ecological rationality of heuristics, see Todd et  al. 2012). With respect 
to using bibliometric indicators to make predictions, one could ask, for example, to what 
extent (or not) one-reason heuristics might be  useful in environments in which it is diffi-
cult to foresee research quality (e.g., in the evaluation of greater units, such as institutions 
or countries), and in which bibliometric indicators are highly correlated with other indica-
tors of research performance (this is also especially the case with greater units). One could 
also ask to what extent (and under what conditions) the number of units that have to be 
assessed (e.g., many institutions or countries) might shape the usefulness of corresponding 
heuristics.
We hasten to add that, as any other method of decision making, naturally also one-rea-
son BBHs will lead to errors even when they are relied upon in particularly fitting task-
environments. However, it is an empirical question to what extent that error rate is larger 
than that of methods of judgment which follow other (e.g., more complex) rules.
Leaving such ecological considerations aside, from a descriptive point of view, 
it does not seem unreasonable to suspect that one-reason BBHs might be frequently 
used in research evaluation: these days, research must be evaluated under great time 
18 Note that with ‘above average’ not necessarily a statistical term is meant. This term is used often in 
research evaluation to refer to remarkable or non-standard performance.
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pressure.19 Outside of the area of research evaluation, much (e.g., experimental) work 
has focused on the role of time pressure as one of many possible task-related deter-
minants of decision making, fueling a multi-faceted literature (e.g., Bobadilla-Suarez 
and Love 2018; Glöckner and Hodges 2011; Marewski and Schooler 2011; Pachur and 
Hertwig 2006; Payne et  al. 1988; Rieskamp and Hoffrage 2008). For research evalu-
ation, one could start out by examining to what extent, and if so when and why, dif-
ferent BBHs may be more likely to be relied upon (or not) when the time available to 
make decisions varies from little to abundant. Furthermore, to what extent bibliomet-
rics can, in the first place, realistically be replaced by other evaluation strategies may 
depend on (multiple) other aspects of the evaluative task environment at hand. If only a 
few research institutes with different missions (i.e., goals, see section “Four points key 
to the study of fast-and-frugal heuristics”) must be evaluated, an informed peer review 
process including a thorough indicator report—reflecting the different missions—may 
be feasible to conduct. However, evaluators may actually be forced to resort to simpler 
methods when they face the challenging task of evaluating numerous institutions or sci-
entists with the same mission: producing high-impact papers. When considering mul-
tiple options (e.g., numerous institutions), heuristics can be particularly helpful: early 
on—in a first step—in the decision process, heuristics can be relied upon to downsize 
the set of options (e.g., Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Marewski et al. 2010a). Such 
consideration-set (e.g., Alba and Chattopadhyay 1985; Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990) 
generating decision processes have been described in  consumer choice (see Gigerenzer 
and Gaissmaier 2011) and even in election forecasting (Marewski et al. 2010e). A clas-
sic model of choice that systematically eliminates options and that our readers might be 
familiar with has been developed in the 70ies by Amos Tversky (1972); it is tellingly 
called elimination-by-aspects.
Paralleling consumer and other  choice situations, foundations for the promotion of 
research often receive more applications (e.g., for post-doctoral fellowship programs) than 
can be processed in a thorough peer review process (Bornmann and Daniel 2005). Thus, it 
is necessary to perform a pre-selection to reduce the number of candidates to be evaluated 
in more detail. The results of Horta and Santos (2016) suggest that “those who publish dur-
ing their PhD have greater research production and productivity, and greater numbers of 
yearly citations and citations throughout their career compared to those who did not pub-
lish during their PhD” (p. 28). Similar results have been reported by Pinheiro et al. (2014) 
and Laurance et al. (2013). Based on the findings from such studies, a one-clever-cue heu-
ristic for the pre-selection of applicants could prescribe selecting those who have published 
the most papers (articles or reviews) during their PhD:
Search rule: Search for all substantial publications, produced by the candidates dur-
ing their PhD.
Stopping rule: Stop search once all such publications have been identified.
Decision rule: Pre-select those candidates who have published most papers.
This heuristic might work in environments where applications focus on just one scientific 
field (e.g., decision making), implying that publication practices would be similar across 
applicants. Reversely, this heuristic might not be well-suited in task environments where, 
say, historians compete for grants alongside with neuroscientists: The latter will, likely, 
19 That said, to the best of our knowledge, no large scale surveys have been conducted to test this assump-
tion.
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have more publications at the end of their PhD. An analogue ecological line of reasoning 
would apply if a similar heuristic were relied upon to select units worth additional funding 
(e.g., as in the Excellent Initiative in Germany20): choosing units worthy for considera-
tion of additional funding based on the past numbers of substantial publications might be 
ecologically rational in environments where units have the same missions, but not where 
missions differ (e.g., publish basic research versus producing industry innovations, patents, 
or other ‘applied output’).
This pre-selection heuristic could by further refined—based on the results by Bornmann 
and Williams (2017) as well as Cole and Cole (1967)—by considering citations or jour-
nal metrics in a second step: Pre-selected candidates could be winnowed down further by 
identifying those with most publications in reputable journals or by zooming in onto those 
candidates with a minimum amount of citations.
Selection heuristics could also aid in the last decision round of a peer review process. In 
these last rounds, foundations face the problem of choosing among candidates all of whom 
are all well-suited, but available funds are insufficient for supporting all. Funders experi-
ment with a lottery system to select among these candidates (Bishop 2018). The problem 
with lottery systems is that they do not rely on scientific quality criteria. BBHs could be 
an interesting alternative. For example, those candidates could be selected who have pub-
lished the most highly-cited papers (i.e. papers belonging to the 10% most frequently cited 
papers within their field and publication year). This indicator is seen as the most robust 
field-normalized indicator (Hicks et al. 2015).
Summary and Outlook: Towards the study of bibliometrics‑based 
heuristics (BBHs)
The fast-and-frugal heuristics research program offers a theoretical framework for under-
standing how people can make ecologically rational decisions. Those decisions can be pre-
dictions about the future as well as inferences about the past or present (e.g., as in rankings, 
classifications, or estimations). Those decisions can also concern choice (e.g., of differ-
ent courses of action), or search and selection (e.g., of candidates or mates), to name just 
two other examples. Many heuristics bet on a single cue (or few cues) among the many 
available cues for decision-making. Other heuristics draw on many predictor variables, but 
weigh them equally (e.g., as the tallying heuristic; see section “How the study of heuris-
tics can inform the study of bibliometrics”). Those heuristics simplify tasks by ignoring 
order (ordering can be mathematically  conceived of as a form of weighting; Gigerenzer 
and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011).
In contrast to the widespread view that complex tasks warrant complex, sophisticated 
solutions and that simple solutions reduce accuracy (and/or involve other trade-offs), the 
study of heuristics has shown—to speak with Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009)—that “less 
information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy” (p. 107). Decision mak-
ers—as a rule—often do not know all the relevant data  (e.g., inherently limited informa-
tion collections); they may have limited time and they have limited  information-process-
ing ability (e.g., working memories; see e.g., Simon 1990; see e.g., Marewski et al. 2010a, 
20 See http://www.dfg.de/en/resea rch_fundi ng/progr ammes /excel lence _initi ative /index .html.
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d for couching that point in terms of the fast-and-frugal heuristics framework). They fre-
quently operate in environments with criteria (outcomes) that  are difficult to predict (e.g., 
decision makers in science who try to select the next breakthrough research projects). In 
these uncertain environments, “less information can be more” (e.g., Marewski et al. 2010a, 
p. 111)  when it comes to making inferences—that is, judgments about something that 
is unknown, be it because the criterion to be inferred lies in the future or because it is 
simply not accessible at present (see e.g., Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier 2011; Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2009; Hafenbrädl et al. 2016; Marewski et al. 
2010a; Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2017).
In this paper, we propose to conceptualize the use of bibliometrics in research evaluation 
in terms of fast-and-frugal heuristics. Bibliometrics are frequently used in different evalua-
tive contexts. They reduce the information for decision-making to publication and citation 
numbers. More generally speaking, this reduction may be ecologically rational in environ-
ments where active researchers are publishing researchers and where every new   line of 
work has to be framed in terms of past research (by citing the corresponding publications). 
These environments can be found in most disciplines. In section “Bibliometrics-based heu-
ristics (BBHs) illustrated: One-reason decision making in research evaluation”, we gave 
examples of how bibliometrics can be conceptualized in terms of one-reason heuristics. 
However, this conceptualization can be seen as a first very rough attempt only.
In psychology (and beyond), a line of systematic research of heuristics has emerged 
with numerous publications, including many journal articles, foundational books (e.g., 
Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Hertwig et al. 2013; Todd et al. 2012), and literature that makes the 
fast-and-frugal heuristics research program easily accessible to practitioners and a (non-
scienfic) audience (e.g., Gigerenzer 2007, 2014). Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) present 
“ten well-studied heuristics for which there is evidence that they are in the adaptive toolbox 
of humans” (p. 130). In coining the notion “homo heuristicus” (e.g., p. 134), those authors 
formulate a “vision of human nature based on an adaptive toolbox of heuristics rather than 
on traits, attitudes, preferences, and similar internal explanations” (p. 134).
Based on the results from research on heuristics, we encourage studying the use of 
bibliometrics in research evaluation under the umbrella of the fast-and-frugal heuristics 
framework. This does not mean that the use of bibliometrics is reduced to only one heu-
ristic model. Instead, it should be the objective to develop an adaptive toolbox including 
a collection of heuristics to have a coordinated set of BBH available for specific evalua-
tion environments (Marewski and Bornmann 2019). This objective is in accordance with 
a recent call by Waltman and van Eck (2016) for contextualized scientometric analyses 
“which is based on the principles of context, simplicity, and diversity” (p. 542). Every heu-
ristic should be tuned to specific environments and designed for specific evaluation tasks 
(Bornmann and Marx 2018).
Note that specifying the toolbox of BBHs does not necessarily entail coming up with 
an unlimited (or overwhelmingly large) number of heuristics—how many different tools 
are needed and useful would be a function of the task environments considered and the 
(e.g., research, applied) questions being asked. What is more, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier’s 
(2011) overview demonstrates how many different heuristics are crafted from common 
building blocks. As they and others point out, those building blocks allow describing the 
larger collection of heuristics in terms of  a smaller set of more elementary and  (non-
arbitrarily) combinable constituents. Specifically, depending on how a smaller number of 
search, stopping and decision rules are matched with each other, a larger number of heu-
ristics can be designed (Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Todd and Gigerenzer 2000). For instance, 
search rules that sequentially arrange predictor variables (e.g., as in Fig. 1’s fast-and-frugal 
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tree), can be complemented by even simpler search rules that contemplate predictor vari-
ables in any (e.g., random) order (see e.g., Gigerenzer et al. 2012). The search could end 
after a certain number (e.g., 3) of predictors has been taken into account or after a certain 
amount of time has elapsed (e.g., 10 min).21 Upon the execution of those or other stop-
ping rules, decisions could then be made by simply counting how many predictor variables 
suggest one option as opposed to another. This equal-weighting decision rule is built into, 
for instance, tallying heuristics (see e.g., Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Marewski et al. 
2010a, see section “How the study of heuristics can inform the study of bibliometrics”), 
and is helpful in many domains, ranging from medicine to financial investment and ava-
lanche forecasting (e.g., Hafenbrädl et al. 2016). Identifying such building blocks might, 
too, be helpful for studying the use of BBH.
In short, in line with research on other fast-and-frugal heuristics, work on BBHs should 
target four key points (see section  “Decision making under uncertainty: Theory and 
implications”).
 (i) Descriptive: The use of bibliometrics in research evaluation should be systematically 
studied based on the conceptual framework: Do researchers and other decision-
makers in science use BBH? If so, what heuristic do they use in which context and 
how frequently? What are the common building blocks of those heuristics? Are there 
differences in the use of BBH between citizen and professional bibliometricians 
(Leydesdorff et al. 2016)? According to Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) “[n]
umerous studies have documented systematic individual differences in the use of 
heuristics” (p. 459). Studies targeting those questions should work out the contents 
of an adaptive toolbox for research evaluation (see above). And just as research on 
heuristics in other areas, corresponding studies in evaluative bibliometrics should 
be open to the possibility that heuristics are not used at all (e.g., Glöckner et al. 
2014; Jekel and Glöckner 2018b; Newell 2005), and include alternative decision 
mechanisms in model comparisons (Marewski et al. 2010d).22
 (ii) Ecological: If BBHs are used in research evaluation, to which evaluative environ-
ments are the heuristics adapted: in which contexts does relying on a given BBH lead 
to accurate (and/or e.g., fast) decisions and in which environments will the BBH pro-
duce inappropriate results? When, why, and how will clear effort-accuracy trade-offs 
occur and when, why, and how will ‘less be more’? How well do BBHs perform 
compared to other methods, including other indicators and more complex procedures 
(see section “Reasons for using bibliometrics-based heuristics (BBHs) instead of 
other strategies for research evaluation”). Those questions focus on the ecological 
rationality of BBHs and their relative performance.
 (iii) Applied: How can research evaluation be improved? Research on the ecological 
rationality of heuristics can inform prescriptions and recommendations: The Inter-
national Society for Informetrics and Scientometrics (ISSI)—the international asso-
21 Time-based rules have been described for very different tasks in different contexts (e.g., giving-up time 
rules in the animal foraging literature).
22 In addition to classic weighted-additive integration strategies and optimization approaches (e.g., utility 
maximization), candidate decision mechanism include, for instance, connectionist networks (e.g., Glöckner 
and Betsch 2008) and exemplar models (e.g., Juslin and Persson 2002) which might well predict decisions 
better than corresponding candidate heuristics (see, e.g., Glöckner and Betsch 2008; Heck and Erdfelder 
2017).
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ciation of scholars and professionals active in the interdisciplinary study of science, 
science communication, and science policy23—could publish a list of well-studied 
BBH (an adaptive toolbox for the use of bibliometrics in research evaluation) along-
side with the environments for which there is evidence that those heuristics lead to 
accurate or otherwise meaningful decisions (Bornmann and Marx 2018). Based on 
this adaptive toolbox, the use of BBH could be effectively taught by professional 
bibliometricians in workshops and courses. Moreover, from a policy-point of view, 
research environments could be changed so that certain heuristics work better, or 
alternatively, decision makers could be recommended to use other (e.g., new) heu-
ristics than they used previously (see also Marewski and Bornmann 2019 for com-
plementary proposals, focusing more on changing the culture of research evaluations 
and the statistical and field-specific expertise that ought to be required to conduct 
them).
 (iv) Methodological: How can the usage of BBHs be studied? For one, field and labora-
tory studies could be used in  similar ways as they have been relied upon in descrip-
tive research on other heuristics (e.g., Brandstätter et al. 2006; Bröder and Gaiss-
maier 2007; Garcia-Retamero and Dhami 2009; Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2002). 
Those studies might not only indicate when people may rely on a given heuristic, 
equally important, they can also show when people do not rely on a given heuristic 
(see e.g., Bröder 2011; Johnson et al. 2008; Pohl 2006; Rieskamp and Otto 2006, 
for examples from other areas of research on heuristics). Secondly, the prescriptive, 
ecological question might be answered with mathematical analyses and computer 
simulation studies—again, similar to research on the ecological rationality of heuris-
tics in other areas (e.g., Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Katsikopoulos et al. 2010; 
Marewski and Schooler 2011; Martignon and Hoffrage 1999).
   Corresponding benchmarks to gauge the performance of BBH might be machine-
learning algorithms, and other advanced inference and classification machineries 
(e.g., Brighton 2006; Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Goldstein and Gigerenzer 
2009). Similar to research on heuristics in sports that makes use of expert-based 
rankings as performance-benchmarks (e.g., Scheibehenne and Bröder 2007; Serwe 
and Frings 2006), other benchmarks might be, for instance, assessments made by 
peers. The studies by Auspurg et al. (2015), Diekmann et al. (2012), Pride and Knoth 
(2018), and Traag and Waltman (2019) which we discussed in section “Reasons for 
using bibliometrics-based heuristics (BBHs) instead of other strategies for research 
evaluation” are examples for comparing peer-assessments to bibliometrics.24
23 See http://www.issi-socie ty.org.
24 In the introduction to this paper, we wrote that complexity can arrive at the evaluation stage when (i) 
many indicators are considered and (ii) evaluation procedures include numerous internal and external 
stages. In so doing we did not provide a precise definition of complexity. Yet, it is important to realize 
that the notion of complexity is, in the literature on fast-and-frugal heuristics and other computational and 
mathematical models, typically more formally defined, and indeed, relative model complexity can often be 
assessed when comparing the performance of different heuristics, optimization, and other formal models. 
To parallel that line of work in research evaluation, different (allegedly) more complex research evalua-
tion procedures (e.g., multiple rounds of peer-review, composite indicators and/or combinations of those) 
could, ideally be, specified in terms of formal models. Then it may be possible to assess their complexity, 
for instance, in computer simulations as well as by taking into account drivers of model complexity, such 
as the number of free parameters a model requires estimating, its functional form, or the acceptable param-
eter space (e.g., Marewski and Olsson 2009; Marewski et al. 2010a, d; Pitt et al. 2002). To speak with Pitt 
et al. (2002), complexity “refers to the flexibility inherent in a model that enables it to fit diverse patterns 
of data” (p. 473). All by itself, considering many indicators does not necessarily imply an increased degree 
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Conclusion
In research evaluation, the oldest and most frequently used method for assessing research 
activities is the peer review process (Bornmann 2011). This qualitative form of research 
evaluation can be conceived of as belonging to the class of complex (and, in the views of 
many: ‘rational’) judgment strategies. Peer review processes are frequently put in place 
when single contributions, such as journal submissions and grant applications must be 
evaluated. However, as the example in the introduction shows, the process is also used in 
the evaluation of many and larger units, such as universities or single researchers. Presum-
ably, peer review processes are based on the assumption that all possible information (on 
manuscripts, researchers, applications etc.) is taken into account and then differentially 
weighted. Involving experts in research evaluation, most likely ensures, so the rationale 
goes, that assessments are based on full information (e.g., on all aspects of scientific qual-
ity). In general, this premise is only limited by reviewer tasks which exceed field-specific 
expertise: for instance, societal impact considerations are difficult to assess for reviewers in 
grant peer review procedures (Derrick and Samuel 2016).
Since the end of the 1980s, relying on mere publication and citation numbers as cue to 
scientific quality has become increasingly popular (Bornmann, in press). Nowadays, cor-
responding bibliometric indicators are often used as complement to expert peer-review; 
sometimes bibliometrics even fully replace expert judgments. However, bibliometrics are 
not yet at the center stage of a fully established profession, and, perhaps due to their open-
ness to non-specialists and peripheral actors, a broad consensus as to which indicators 
should be used in what settings has yet to emerge (Jappe et al. 2018).
While all assessment methods—be they based on peer review, different bibliometric or 
other indicators, for that matter—have their specific advantages and disadvantages, typi-
cal arguments made in favor of resorting to bibliometrics are that:
 (i) the application of bibliometrics is less costly than that of peer review (the time of 
experts is valuable);
 (ii) large numbers of units can be evaluated and compared (it is difficult for peers to 
overview and assess a large number of units);
 (iii) publication and citation numbers can be used to assess large units (peers have usually 
problems to assess large units, such as organizations and countries, because of their 
complexity).
Footnote 24 (continued)
of complexity (=flexibility) compared to a model that would consider only a few indicators. Just think of 
the tallying heuristic—this model takes into account several predictor variables, but it weighs them equally, 
requiring no parameter estimation and therefore not gaining any flexibility from estimation. Another model 
might take fewer predictor variables into account, but require estimating a weight for each of them, letting 
the model become more flexible in fitting existing data. In short, when it comes to benchmarking BBHs, a 
research program on BBHs may not only specify precise formal models of BBHs but also strive to formal-
ize (allegedly more complex) approaches. That said, just as in research on other heuristics, it is, of course, 
possible to simply assess the performance of different BBHs against those of alternative procedures that are 
deemed to be relevant competitors—be it because those competitors are (i) standard procedures, and/or are 
(ii) particularly elaborate, time-consuming, laborious, costly, and/or resource-intensive, and/or (iii) repre-
sent expert judgments (e.g., peer review).
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In research evaluation, bibliometrics and peer review are commonly used as stand-
alones. The Leiden Ranking, for instance, is a sheer bibliometric ranking of universities 
worldwide.25 Submissions to journals are assessed by reviewers only. However, bibliomet-
rics and peer review can also be used in combination: in informed peer review, peers assess 
units (e.g., institutions) based on their own impressions and based on a bibliometric report. 
Moreover, sometimes bibliometric indicators are considered together with other indicators. 
Examples are university rankings (e.g., the Academic Ranking of World Universities26) 
which are mostly based on bibliometric measures, but additionally draw on other meas-
ures (e.g., number of Nobel laureates) to assess research performance. Although different 
methods do thus exist, complex procedures are generally (i.e., in all evaluation environ-
ments) conceived of as more appropriate than simpler procedures when it comes to evalu-
ating research activities. It is seen as imperative that a complex research process with many 
uncertainties is evaluated with a complex—and hence seemingly rational—procedure. A 
related imperative comes with the usage of indicators and statistics: numbers are often seen 
as key to establishing seemingly ‘objective’ evaluations (Marewski and Bornmann 2019). 
We are aware of only a few studies investigating the use of bibliometrics in different 
evaluative contexts empirically. For example, Hammarfelt and Haddow (2018) examined 
metrics use among humanities scholars in two countries and Gunashekar et al. (2017) stud-
ied how panels at the UK National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) rely on metrics. 
Moed et al. (1985) produced bibliometric results for research groups in the Faculty of Med-
icine and the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences at the University of Leiden. 
The results were discussed then with researchers from the two faculties.
Importantly, this latter study points to several problems in the evaluative use of bib-
liometric data. Indeed, as the literature overview of de Rijcke et al. (2016) shows, much 
work on bibliometrics focuses on “possible effects of evaluation exercises, ‘gaming’ of 
indicators, and strategic responses by scientific communities and others to requirements 
in research assessments” (p. 161). Thus, the bibliometric enterprise’s manipulative and 
negative aspects are at the forefront of scientific interest, but not the possible fruitful and 
advantageous usage of indicators. Moreover, there does not exist a research program study-
ing the environments in which specific BBH (e.g., using bibliometric indicators X, Y, and 
Z in judgment strategy A, B, or C in an informed peer review or without peer review) are 
more successful than other methods (e.g., pure peer review), and reversely, when other 
approaches work better.
Since bibliometric indicators are—as a rule—critically assessed, but used very fre-
quently, the gap between empirical studies and practical usage is surprising (Marewski and 
Bornmann 2019). How is it possible that certain bibliometric indicators, such as the Jour-
nal Impact Factor, remain instruments of research evaluations although prominent and pop-
ular declarations, such as the Declaration on Research Assessment (DORA27), exist against 
its use? What are the benefits which are gained by relying on certain indicators although 
justified critique exists? The frequent usage might indicate that bibliometrics are simply 
very attractive in certain evaluative environments (e.g., because they are easy to use, i.e., 
‘fast-and-frugal’; for a complementary, more historical/societal interpretation, see Mare-
wski and Bornmann 2019).
25 See http://www.leide nrank ing.com.
26 See http://www.shang haira nking .com.
27 See https ://sfdor a.org.
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To conclude, a heuristic research program on the evaluative use of bibliometrics 
might reveal the following: (1) BBHs can be similarly accurate as complex procedures 
(such as peer review) even though they are simpler. (2) The ecological rationality (e.g., 
accuracy) of such heuristics depends on the task environment and the goals at hand. (3) 
Users of bibliometrics can learn to select BBHs from an adaptive toolbox (e.g., pro-
vided by the ISSI society) as a function of the task environment and goals at hand. 
(4) Research evaluation comes with uncertainty which, in turn, might foster using heu-
ristics, both from a descriptive and from a prescriptive (i.e., policy-making) point of 
view.  (5) In addition, so one of us dares to hope (J.N.M.), such a systematic research 
program might also help to reflect to what extent research should be evaluated in the 
first place.
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